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MARITIME SECURITY
AND THREAT OF A
TERRORIST ATTACK
Aniruddha Rajput*

ABSTRACT
The incidents of terrorism have multiplied and so have the
routes through which the terrorists reach their targets. There
is a threat of a terrorist attack from the sea route aimed at
targets on the land. Until now the academic scholarship as well
as treaty practice has focused on challenges of terrorism to the
safety of navigation rather than terrorist threats originating
from the sea. Efforts at treaty making in this direction in the
past are inadequate to address the problem. This article
analyses the legal framework within which response may be
undertaken to neutralize a terrorist threat through preventive
action or after the terrorist act has been committed. It is argued
that it is possible for a coastal state to stay within the purview
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) and take necessary actions against a terrorist vessel.
All states are under an international obligation to suppress
terrorism. Moreover, the UNCLOS mandates that the seas and
oceans have to be used for peaceful purposes. There may not be
an explicit reference to taking action against a terrorist vessel,
yet there is adequate support for such an action as per the
interpretation of various provisions of the UNCLOS. Although
the extent of control exerted by the coastal state in the territorial
sea, contiguous zone, continental shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone
and the high seas varies yet in all these maritime zones coastal
states can undertake necessary actions.

* Member, UN International Law Commission; Consultant, Withers LLP
(London).
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INTRODUCTION

Threats posed by international terrorism are rising and so
are the patterns in which the “targets” of terrorist attacks are
chosen and “routes” which are used to execute these attacks.
Targets of terrorist attacks could be located on the land, air, or
sea. Likewise, the routes chosen to execute these attacks could
be through land, air, or sea or through use of one or more of these
routes. Traditionally, international terrorism or cross border
terrorist attacks have targeted land territory.1 In some cases
even air and sea have been targeted, albeit few in number.2 The
9/11 terrorist attacks exposed the possibility of use of air route
for committing terrorist attacks to target land. This article is
concerned with the use of sea route for committing terrorist
attack on land. The legal regime regulating the steps that could
be taken for prevention of an attack or in response to an attack
on the land originating from the sea route are unexplored under
international law. In the 2008 report of the Oceans and the Law
of the Sea, the Secretary General of the United Nations
identified seven threats to maritime security.3 One of those
threats is international terrorism. The Report noted that
terrorist attacks are capable of causing significant economic
loss.4
The threat of international terrorism has been a
continuous challenge and reports thereafter have continued to
highlight its threat to the activity on the sea.5 These Reports
represent the limited approach to maritime terrorism because
they are limited to protection of the activity on the sea. The 2008
Report specifies that it relates to “terrorist acts against ships,
offshore platforms and other maritime interests.”6 The Report
ignores the possibility of the use of the sea as a route for
committing terrorist attacks and not merely as a target. Even if
sea is not a target, the use of the sea as a route for committing
1 James Stavridis, Terrorists Have Been All Too Effective by Air and Land.
What
If
They
Hit
by
Sea?,
TIME
(June
29,
2017),
https://time.com/4838706/what-if-terrorists-hit-by-sea/.
2 Richard Farrell, Maritime Terrorism: Focusing on the Probable, 60
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REV. 46, 47 (2007).
3 U.N. Secretary-General, Oceans and the law of the sea, ¶ 54–107, U.N.
Doc. A/63/63 (Mar. 10, 2008) [hereinafter Oceans 2008].
4 See id. ¶ 40 (explaining the impact of terrorism beyond force).
5 U.N. Secretary-General, Oceans and the law of the sea, ¶ 43, U.N. Doc.
A/70/74/Add.1 (Sept. 1, 2015).
6 Id.
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terrorist attacks ought to be covered under the threat to
maritime security. The last phrase: “other maritime interests”
has not been elaborated in the Report. But arguably, it is broad
enough to encompass terrorist threats to all activities relating to
the sea and maritime security.
The challenge of a seaward terrorist attack for maritime
security is daunting. The notion of maritime security is broad
and it encompasses various aspects.7 One of the elementary
features of maritime security is ensuring that the area
immediately adjacent to the coast of a state is not used in a way
that the territorial integrity or political independence of the
state is not jeopardized. 8 A terrorist attack committed or
attempted through the sea route commits precisely this by using
the sea to pose a threat to the coast.9 Therefore, prevention of
the use of sea routes for committing a terrorist attack on the land
relates to the larger question of maritime security. Threats from
seaward terrorist attacks are often ignored because a majority
of a state’s energy and resources are spent on securing land
borders.10 Additionally, surveillance of coastline is a complex
exercise. Land boundaries can be secured through fencing or
other advanced technology. But there are significant challenges
in controlling ingress and egress from the sea. 11 Unlike land
boundaries, it is impossible for the coastal state to seal sea
boundaries due to various obligations under the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”).12 Access to the
7 NATALIE KLEIN, MARITIME SECURITY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 4 (Oxford
Univ. Press 2012).
8 See Oceans 2008, supra note 3, ¶ 60 (encouraging states to be vigilant
over international waters near the coast).
9 Natalya A. Knyazeva & Alexander I. Korobeev, Maritime Terrorism and
Piracy: The Threat to Maritime Security, 6 MEDITERRANEAN J. SOC. SCIENCES
226, 226 (2015).
10 See generally The Rise and Countering of Maritime Terrorism by the
United
States,
RISE
TO
PEACE:
BLOG
(Apr.
20,
2021),
https://www.risetopeace.org/2021/04/20/the-rise-and-countering-of-maritimeterrorism-by-the-united-states/risetopece/ (explaining the importance of
shifting the focus from securing land borders to coastlines).
11 See V.M. Syam Kumar, ‘Piracy, Private Maritime Security Companies
and Coastal Security in India: Lessons from the Enrica Lexie and Seaman
Guard Ohio Cases’, in NATIONAL SECURITY MANAGEMENT IN FEDERAL
STRUCTURES: PERSPECTIVES FROM INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES, at 57–59
(2014) (ebook) (using India as an example of these difficulties).
12 Alex Marsh, More to Maritime Boundaries: The Extended Continental
Shelf, SOVEREIGN LIMITS (Feb. 4, 2022), https://sovereignlimits.com/blog/more-
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sea and the freedom of navigation of other states cannot be
unduly interfered with. The gravity of the challenge depends on
the geographical location and topography of the coast.13 The
problem gets compounded if there are conflicting maritime
claims and heavy traffic or other offshore installations. 14 The
length of the coastline also creates problems. If the coastline is
vast, surveillance is unmanageable.15
A terrorist attack could take any one of the various forms:
A. Hijacking of a commercial or navy vessel. Achille
Lauro is the most well-known case where a
Palestinian guerilla group seized an Italian flagged
cruise ship on the high seas.16 They demanded
release of fifty Palestinian prisoners and when their
demands were not met, they killed an American
prisoner.17
B. Attack on a commercial or navy vessel. In such an
attack the terrorists may board the ship and commit
terrorist actions or ram a small ship loaded with
explosives on the targeted vessel. For example, in
the USS Cole incident, a small Al Qaeda boat
inflicted major damage to a large military vessel.18
C. Terrorist attack on an offshore installation.
D. Smuggling of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
for terrorist actions.
E. Using a vessel to transport terrorists and/or material
to be used for committing terrorist actions into a
state or after committing or attempting to commit a
to-maritime-boundaries-the-extended-continental-shelf.
13 See Marsh, supra note 12.
14 See PUSHPITA DAS, COASTAL SECURITY: THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE 8 (2013),
http://www.idsa.in/system/files/Monograph22.pdf (showing how, in India,
compounding factors pose a challenge).
15 Joe DiRenzo III & Chris Doane, America’s Maritime Homeland Security
Challenge: Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Borders, in 1 HOMELAND SECURITY:
BORDERS AND POINTS OF ENTRY 224 (James J. F. Forest ed., 2006).
16
Richard
Pallardy,
Achille
Lauro
hijacking,
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/event/Achille-Lauro-hijacking (last visited Mar.
22, 2022).
17 Id.
18 NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO), BRIEFING: COMBATING
TERRORISM
AT
SEA,
at
3
(2008),
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2006_09/2010_03_D011B221E
26B40D891C22D0CA8A7D9AC_active_endeavour2008-e.pdf.
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terrorist act, the terrorists may use a vessel to
escape.
F. In situation (e), the terrorists may enter the coastal
state to commit terrorist actions in the coastal state
or pass through the coastal state to enter another
state to commit terrorist acts. Or, after committing
or attempting to commit a terrorist attack, the
terrorists may cross land borders to enter into the
coastal state to escape through the coast of that
coastal state.
In situations (a) to (d) the target is the activity on the sea
whereas in situations (e) and (f) sea route is used to target land.
Situations (a) to (d) related to maritime navigation or security
on the sea.19 Occurrence of these situations creates fear of
insecurity and impacts maritime trade.20 Maritime trade has an
important share in the overall international trade.21 Such
attacks have taken place in the past and therefore attracted
academic attention.22 Situation (e) and (f) pose challenges to
security of a coastal state or other states connected to the coastal
state through a land boundary.23 The peculiarity of situations
(e) and (f) is that they are not primarily related to security on
the sea but security on the land. In these situations, there is an
inchoate link with the activity on the sea, and therefore
maritime security is involved.24 The subject of the threat of a
terrorist attack to a coastal state and to states adjoining the
coastal state by land boundary is important due to the practical
significance and severe consequences if such an attack
materializes.25 It is important to look at the legality of the
responses that a state can undertake. This area has not received
19 Gal Luft & Anne Korin, Terrorism Goes to Sea, 83 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 61,
64 (2004).
20 Id. at 62.
21 Id.
22 See, e.g., KLEIN, supra note 7, at 8; Wolff von Heinegg, The Proliferation
Security Initiative: Security v. Freedom of Navigation?, in 81 INTERNATIONAL
LAW CHALLENGES: HOMELAND SECURITY AND COMBATING TERRORISM 55, 66
(Thomas Mck. Sparks & Glenn M. Sulmasy eds., 2005); Assaf Harel, Preventing
Terrorist Attacks on Offshore Platforms: Do States Have Sufficient Legal
Tools?, 4 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 131, 134–35 (2012); Luft & Korin, supra note 19,
at 61–62.
23 DAS, supra note 14, at 21–22.
24 Id. at 22.
25 DAS, supra note 14, at 23–24.
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adequate attention in academic literature. Therefore, this
article is limited to situations (e) and (f) and explores whether
the present system of international law is adequately equipped
to address these situations.
There are three instances where such a terrorist attack took
place and all the three relate to India. On March 12, 1993,
thirteen coordinated bomb explosions killed more than 200
people and injured 800.26 The explosives used for the bomb
explosion were brought into India through the sea route27 and
the perpetrators of the bomb explosion escaped through the sea
route.28
On November 26, 2008, ten terrorists landed on the coast of
Mumbai, India armed with weapons and entered the city.29
After completing the initial journey in a small ship, around four
nautical miles away from the coast of Mumbai they got onto a
small speed-boat, an inflatable rubber dinghy.30 Therefore,
neither their journey nor disembarking was under suspicion.31
The place they landed is surrounded by fishermen’s colonies and
the sea water is calm in this area.32 This obliterated the
possibility of suspicion. 33 They conducted twelve coordinated
shootings and bombing incidents that killed 164 people,
including foreigners.34
In January 2015, approximately 365 kilometers off the coast
1993: Bombay hit by devastating blasts, BBC NEWS (Mar. 12, 1993),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/12/newsid_4272000/42
72943.stm.
27 Five people get 3 years in jail for smuggling in RDX, ECON. TIMES (May
19, 2007, 3:13 AM), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-andnation/five-people-get-3-years-in-jail-for-smuggling-inrdx/articleshow/2060944.cms?from=mdr.
28 Rajesh Kunayil, Coastal Security in India: Challenges and Policy
Concerns after 26/11 Mumbai Terror Attacks, in MARITIME SECURITY OF INDIA:
THE COASTAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND POLICY OPTIONS 70, 75 (Vij Books ed.,
2014).
29 Soutik Biswas, Mumbai 26/11 attacks: Six corpses, a mobile phone call
and one survivor, BBC NEWS (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/worldasia-india-46314555.
30 Mohammed Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab Alias Abu Mujahid v. State
of Maharashtra, (2012) 8 S.C.R. 295, 378 (India).
31 Id. at 384.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34
Mumbai
Terror
Attacks
Fast
Facts,
CNN,
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/18/world/asia/mumbai-terror-attacks/ (Dec. 3,
2021).
26
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of India the Indian coast guard intercepted a suspicious fishing
vessel.35 The vessel contained explosives and those on board
detonated the explosives immediately.36
These incidents took place in India and parallels of such
incidents are not found in other places.37 However, this does not
mean that the terrorists would not resort to this route in other
places. These attacks have sparked debate about the nature and
extent of security measures that need to be employed to tackle
threats from the sea.38 However, whether the current legal
regime is adequate to tackle the threat of a terrorist attack from
the sea in international law is not yet addressed.
In the three incidents discussed above and generally in
situations (e) and (f), terrorists prefer to use small vessels.39
Using large vessels for terrorist attacks is difficult, 40 especially
considering the chances of their detection. Smaller vessels are
always convenient – they are simple and more frequently used
by terrorists for attack via explosives.41 This article focuses on
the legal regime regulating the use of small vessels to commit
terrorist attack and how coastal states can take action against
them while the vessel is at the sea. Once the terrorist is on the
land territory, the terrorist would be covered under the domestic
jurisdiction of that state.42 There is no legal definition of a
terrorist vessel.43 The word “terrorist vessel” has been used in
Rajat Pandit, Coast Guard foils 26/11-type attack, intruder boat blows
itself
up,
TIMES
INDIA
(Jan.
3,
2015),
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Coast-Guard-foils-26/11-typeattack-intruder-boat-blows-itself-up/articleshow/45737506.cms.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 John F. Bradford, The Maritime Strategy of the United States:
Implications for Indo-Pacific Sea Lanes, 33 CONTEMP. SE. ASIA 183, 191 (2011);
ROUTLEDGE, INDIA’S NAVAL STRATEGY AND ASIAN SECURITY 29 (Anit Mukherjee
& C. Raja Mohan eds., 1st ed. 2016); INST. DEFENCE STUD. & ANALYSES, NAVAL
BORDER MANAGEMENT: SELECT DOCUMENTS 15 (Pushpita Das ed., 2010).
39 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., SMALL VESSEL SECURITY
STRATEGY i (2004) (discussing common situations in which terrorists may use
small vessels).
40 PAUL W. PARFOMAK & JOHN FRITELLI, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33787,
MARITIME SECURITY: POTENTIAL TERRORIST ATTACKS AND PROTECTION
PRIORITIES 9 (2007).
41 Id.
42 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2332(b)(2) (2018) (stating that the United States
has jurisdiction over terrorism activity occurring within the United States’
territory, suggesting other countries have similar methods of jurisdiction).
43 See, e.g., § 18 U.S.C. 2332i(e)(13) (2018) (providing definition of the word
35
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this article to refer to a small vessel used by terrorists to
perpetrate terrorist attack against the coastal state. The
terrorist vessel may be used to transport terrorists, ammunition
and explosives, or other preparations necessary for the
commission of a terrorist act.44 The vessel may have already
been taken over by terrorists from the original owner through
use of force or deceit.
The steps that a coastal state can take under international
law, and particularly under UNCLOS, are discussed in detail in
this article. This article is divided into five sections. Section I
is the introduction. Section II sets out the international
obligations of states to suppress terrorist activities and by
indulging in a terrorist act, a terrorist vessel is acting contrary
to international peace and security. Therefore, coastal states are
not only permitted but also obligated to suppress terrorist
activities. Section III focuses on the extent of power exercisable
by a coastal state over terrorist vessels in different maritime
zones such as the territorial sea, contiguous zone, continental
shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone, and the high seas. In addition
to UNCLOS, different international instruments have emerged
that provide the scope of control and authority exercisable by the
coastal states. And finally, Section IV discusses responses that
can be taken within the sphere of international law to prevent a
terrorist vessel from committing a terrorist act or how to handle
a terrorist attack after it has been committed.
II. RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR SUPPRESSING TERRORIST
ACTIVITIES
Suppression of terrorism has been on the agenda of the
international community since the time of the League of
Nations.45 Terrorism in all forms and in all places has been
condemned by the international community. The General
Assembly and Security Council have passed resolutions to this
effect from time to time, including binding resolutions under
Chapter VII by the Security Council.46 Some common themes
"vessel," with no definition for "terrorist vessel").
44 PARFOMAK & FRITELLI, supra note 40.
45 Ben Saul, The Legal Response of the League of Nations to Terrorism, 73
J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 78, 78 (2006).
46 U.N. Charter art. 39–51; see, e.g., S.C. Res. 1377 (Nov. 12, 2001) (calling
on all states to take urgent actions to combat terrorism); see, e.g., S.C. Res.
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emerge from these resolutions.
Fundamentally, the
international community is deeply concerned with the menace of
terrorism.47 Resolutions by the General Assembly and the
Security Council have “[u]nequivocally [condemned] all acts,
methods and practices of terrorism as criminal and
unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation, in all their forms
and manifestations, wherever and by whomever committed, in
particular those which could threaten international peace and
security.”48 The condemnation of terrorism in these resolutions
is not an aspirational statement, but they are requirements for
concrete actions from the states.49 Moreover, these resolutions
condemn terrorist actions in such a way because of their impact
on humanity and their threat to international peace and
security.50 The General Assembly in Resolution 49/60 declared
that:
Acts, methods and practices of terrorism constitute a grave
violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations,
which may pose a threat to international peace and security,
jeopardize friendly relations among States, hinder international
cooperation and aim at the destruction of human rights,
fundamental freedoms and the democratic bases of society.51

Maintenance of international peace and security is one of
the fundamental purposes of the UN Charter.52 It has been
stated more than once that international terrorism constitutes
one of the most serious threats to international peace and
1456 (Jan. 20, 2003) (calling on all states to take further action to prevent and
suppress all active and passive support to terrorism and comply with S.C. Res.
1377); see, e.g., S.C. Res. 2249 (Nov. 20, 2015) (reaffirming prior resolutions
calling states to combat terrorism).
47 See United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee
(CTED),
About
Us,
U.N.
(Dec.
2021),
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil.ctc/fil
es/cted_factsheets_dec_2021.pdf (describing that countering terrorism has
been on the agenda of the United Nations for decades).
48 See S.C. Res. 1269, ¶ 1 (Oct. 19, 1999) (highlighting that the Security
Council reaffirmed the General Assembly resolution 49/60 which used
identical language to condemn terrorism); see, e.g., G.A. Res. 49/60, annex,
Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, ¶ 1 (Feb. 17,
1995) (providing the basis for the current language).
49 See S.C. Res. 1269, supra note 48, ¶ 2 (reiterating the state’s
commitment to combatting terrorism).
50 G.A. Res. 49/60, supra note 48, ¶ 2.
51 Id.
52 U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 1.
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security and is contrary to the purposes and principles of the
United Nations.53 Presently, there is no agreed definition of
terrorism. However, certain actions undoubtedly constitute
terrorist acts. Some of which have been specified in Resolution
49/60:
Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in
the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for
political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever
the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial,
ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify
them.54

The phrase maritime terrorism is used to encompass
terrorist attacks emanating from the challenges of maritime
security. Samuel Pyeatt Menefee defines maritime terrorism as
“any illegal act directed against ships, their passengers, cargo or
crew, or against seaports with the intent of directly or indirectly
influencing a government [or] group of individuals.” 55 The focus
of this definition is on protection of navigation rather than
protection of a coastal state from a seaward terrorist attack.
Christopher C. Joyner has used somewhat of a different
definition that would include threats from a terrorist vessel. 56
Joyner describes maritime terrorism as “the systematic use or
threat to use acts of violence against international shipping and
53 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1377, supra note 46, pmbl. (stating that terrorism in
all forms is the most serious threat to the peace and security of UN members);
S.C. Res. 1456, supra note 46, pmbl.; S.C. Res. 1535, pmbl. (Mar. 26, 2004);
S.C. Res. 1566, pmbl. (Oct. 8, 2004); S.C. Res. 1787, pmbl. (Dec. 10, 2007); S.C.
Res. 1805, pmbl. (Mar. 20, 2008); S.C. Res. 1963, pmbl. (Dec. 20, 2010); S.C.
Res. 2195, pmbl. (Dec. 19, 2014); S.C. Res. 2178, pmbl. (Sept. 24, 2014); S.C.
Res. 1373, ¶ 5 (Sept. 28, 2001); S.C. Res. 1624, pmbl. (Sept. 14, 2005); S.C. Res.
2133, pmbl. (Jan. 27, 2014); S.C. Res. 2199, pmbl. (Feb. 12, 2015); S.C. Res.
2253, pmbl. (Dec. 17, 2015).
54 G.A. Res. 49/60, supra note 48, ¶ 3; see also G.A. Res. 54/109, pbml. (Feb.
25, 2000) (adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in resolution
54/109 of December 9, 1999, which also describes terrorism in a similar fashion
in its preamble).
55 Md Saiful Karim, The International Law of Maritime Terrorism, in
MARITIME TERRORISM AND THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 39, 40–41 (Robin Churchill & Alex Oude Elferink
eds., Brill Nijhoff 2017); Donna Nincic, The challenge of maritime terrorism:
Threat identification, WMD and regime response, 28 J. STRATEGIC STUD. 619,
620 (2005).
56 Christopher C. Joyner, Suppression of Terrorism on the High Seas: The
1988 IMO Convention on the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 19 ISR. Y.B. HUM.
RTS. 343, 348 (1989).
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maritime services by an individual or group to induce fear and
intimidation in a civilian population in order to achieve political
ambitions or objectives.”57 This definition expands what the idea
of maritime terrorism by including the intimidation of civilian
populations that could be achieved through the use of the sea.
Needless to say that in situations (e) and (f) mass killing
of innocent civilians is involved. Although the killing technically
does not happen on the sea and takes place on the land, the
source of the threat and the resultant terrorist action is from the
sea. Once the terrorists are on land, then the domestic law
would cover the situation completely. But challenges arise while
the terrorists are at sea either before or after the commission of
a terrorist act. The ultimate act that they intend to commit or
have committed is a criminal act intended or calculated to
provoke a state of terror in the minds of the general public. In
sum, the actions committed through terrorist vessels are
terrorist activities under international law. The international
community has urged states to suppress all acts of terrorism,
and situations (e) and (f) are included in them.
States are expected to cooperate in every way possible to
fight against terrorism.58 The Security Council called upon all
states to cooperate and coordinate in taking appropriate steps to
[P]revent and suppress terrorist acts, protect their nations and
other persons against terrorist acts and bring to justice the
perpetrators of such acts; prevent and suppress in their territories
through all lawful means the preparation and financing of any acts
of terrorism; [and] deny those who plan, finance or commit
terrorist acts safe havens by ensuring their apprehension and
prosecution or extradition.59

It is necessary that states cooperate with each other in the
fight against terrorism and ensure, in particular, that the sea is
not used for a terrorist activity. Therefore, a state would have
to take various measures, discussed in the following sections, to
stop the activities of a terrorist vessel whether it is intended to
commit a terrorist act on the coastal state, under situation (e),
or on another state by crossing through the coastal state, under
situation (f).

Id. at 348.
S.C. Res. 1377, supra note 46, ¶ 3.
59 S.C. Res. 1269, supra note 48, ¶ 4.
57
58
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The responsibility to cooperate for the fight against
terrorism is an obligation emanating from the UN Charter and
international law. The General Assembly Resolution 49/60
states that:
States must also fulfil their obligations under the Charter of the
United Nations and other provisions of international law with
respect to combating international terrorism and are urged to take
effective and resolute measures in accordance with the relevant
provisions of international law and international standards of
human rights for the speedy and final elimination of international
terrorism.60

In the concluding paragraph, the Resolution urged the
states to “promote and implement in good faith and effectively”
the provisions of the Declaration.61 After the 9/11 terrorist
attacks, the international community has become more
concerned about these threats, and the Security Council has
called upon the “international community to redouble their
efforts to prevent and suppress terrorist acts including by
increased cooperation and full implementation of the relevant
international anti-terrorist conventions and Security Council
resolutions.”62 The Security Council has directed that the states
should punish the perpetrators of terrorist activities as well as
those who abet commission of such actions. The Security
Council has directed that “States must bring to justice those who
finance, plan, support or commit terrorist acts or provide safe
havens, in accordance with international law, in particular on
the basis of the principle to extradite or prosecute.”63
Resolution 1373 of the Security Council is the most crucial
resolution for the fight against terrorism.64 It was passed under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter with mandatory language.65 It
is binding on all UN Member states.66 Resolution 1373 requires
states to “[t]ake the necessary steps to prevent the commission
of terrorist acts, including by provision of early warning to other

G.A Res. 49/60, supra note 48, ¶ 5.
Id. ¶ 11.
62 S.C. Res. 1368, ¶ 4 (Sept. 12, 2001).
63 S.C. Res. 1456, supra note 46, ¶ 3.
64 S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 53, ¶ 1.
65 Id.
66 U.N. Charter art. 25.
60
61
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States by exchange of information.”67 It further directs states to
“[f]ind ways of intensifying and accelerating the exchange of
operational information.”68 While cooperating, states have to
ensure that
[A]ny person who participates in the financing, planning,
preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting
terrorist acts is brought to justice and ensure that, in addition to
any other measures against them, such terrorist acts are
established as serious criminal offenses in domestic laws and
regulations and that the punishment duly reflects the seriousness
of such terrorist acts.69

States have to “[a]fford one another the greatest measure of
assistance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal
proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts,
including assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession
necessary for the proceedings.”70
Resolution 1373 makes it obligatory on all states to prevent
their nationals or their territories from being used for terrorist
activities.71 The implication of this clause is that states cannot
allow their nationals or vessels to transport terrorists or goods
that are intended for acts of terrorism.72 Therefore, by allowing
a terrorist vessel to be registered in a state and allowing it to
commit terrorist acts, the state of registration would be failing
to prevent commission of terrorist acts. States should “[r]efrain
from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities
or persons involved in terrorist acts.”73 The Resolution restrains
states from providing “active” as well as “passive” support, which
has been reaffirmed in Resolution 1456 of the Security Council
at the meeting at the Ministerial Level74 and thereafter.75 States
cannot allow their nationals or ships and aircrafts to transport
international terrorists and goods aimed at committing terrorist
S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 53, ¶ 2(b).
Id. ¶ 3(a).
69 S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 53, ¶ 2(e).
70 Id. ¶ 2(f).
71 Id. ¶¶ 1–2.
72 Wolff von Heinegg, The Legality of Maritime Interception/Interdiction
Operations Within the Framework of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, 79
INT’L L. STUD. 255, 261–62 (2003).
73 S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 53, ¶ 2(a).
74 S.C. Res. 1456, supra note 53, ¶ 1.
75 S.C. Res. 2199, supra note 53, pmbl.; S.C. Res. 2253, supra note 53, pmbl.
67
68
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acts. If states willingly abstain from these responsibilities, then
they would be in breach of the obligations under the UN
Charter.76
The state of registration should denounce
registration of a terrorist vessel once it is noticed that the vessel
has indulged into terrorist activities. Once the registration is
denounced, the vessel would become a stateless vessel and will
be amenable to the jurisdiction of the coastal state seeking to
take appropriate action to prevent the commission of or take
actions after the commission of a terrorist act.77 By registering
terrorist vessels in its state, a state is providing passive support
to terrorist activities.78 If a state fails to de-recognize a vessel by
de-registering a terrorist vessel, the state would be providing
passive support to terrorist activity.79 If a state continues to
extend protection on the ground that it is the flag state of a
terrorist vessel, then that state would be providing passive
support to a terrorist act and thus violating Resolution 1373.80
Resolution 1373 also addresses the situation where
terrorists enter the coastal state not to commit the offense on the
territory of that state, but to use it as a transition state and enter
another state to commit the terrorist act.81 Even in such a
situation, the coastal state would have to take actions for
suppression of the terrorist act.82 Resolution 1373 directs states
to take following steps: “[p]revent the movement of terrorists or
terrorist groups by effective border controls and controls on
issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and through
measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent
use of identity papers and travel documents.”83
In order to prevent the movement of terrorist groups a
coastal state would have to undertake measures for interdiction.
Heinegg, supra note 72, at 261–62.
See Anne Bardin, Coastal State's Jurisdiction over Foreign Vessels, 14
PACE INT'L L. REV. 27, 24–26 (2002) (describing coastal state's jurisdiction over
un-registered or "stateless" vessels).
78 See generally Md Saiful Karim, Flag State Responsibility for Maritime
Terrorism, 33 SAIS REV. INT’L AFFAIRS 127, 130–32 (2013) (discussing the
challenges of curtailing maritime terrorism activities due to vessel registration
loopholes).
79 Id.
80 Id. at 132.
81 See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 53, ¶ 2(g) (prohibiting terrorists from
moving between countries through border control measures).
82 Id.
83 S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 53, ¶ 2(g).
76
77
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According to Wolff von Heinegg, Resolution 1373 gives ample
power to the coastal state to take all necessary measures against
a vessel that does not disclose necessary information on its
identity and continues the journey.84 In sum, a coastal state is
under an obligation to prevent maritime terrorism and ensure
that vessels registered in its jurisdiction are not used for
terrorist activities, otherwise it would amount to passive support
for terrorist activities.
As is evident above, participating in terrorist activity is a
violation of the UN Charter and international law. 85 The
obligation of states to interdict and take action against a
terrorist vessel precedes the terrorist action and extends even
after a terrorist action has been already committed.86 States are
to cooperate to ensure that they take adequate steps to stop such
a terrorist vessel, whether the terrorist vessel is meant to create
havoc within its territory or within that of another state. 87 The
power a coastal state could exercise on a terrorist vessel depends
on the jurisdiction, and these issues are discussed in the
following section.
III. LEGAL REGIME UNDER THE UNCLOS AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
This section analyses and compares the legal regime of
control that a coastal state can exercise over a terrorist vessel in
various maritime zones under UNCLOS as well as under other
international instruments.
A. Regime under the UNCLOS
UNCLOS is a foundational multilateral treaty dealing
comprehensively with the activities on the sea.88 UNCLOS
exemplifies progressive development in the law of the sea and is
an important step towards codification. An important driving
factor to codify and progressively develop the law of the sea is
Heinegg, supra note 72, at 261–62.
S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 53, ¶ 5.
86 Heinegg, supra note 72, at 261–62 (describing state obligations and
elements needed for states to act under UN Resolution 1373).
87 Id.
88 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
84
85
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the need to ensure peace, security, and friendly relations
between states. This objective is expressed in the preamble of
UNCLOS which states:
Believing that the codification and progressive development of the
law of the sea achieved in this Convention will contribute to the
strengthening of peace, security, cooperation and friendly
relations among all nations in conformity with the principles of
justice and equal rights and will promote the economic and social
advancement of all peoples of the world, in accordance with the
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations as set forth in the
Charter.89

A preamble is an influential component of any treaty
interpretation and is particularly important here since it
contributes to the context of the treaty.90 It influences the scope
of treaty provisions by suggesting whether they are to be
interpreted broadly or narrowly.91
Particularly for a
multilateral treaty, the role of the preamble is very important.
The character of a treaty influences the role of elements of treaty
interpretation.92 A multilateral treaty establishing institutions
with participation of many countries has an element of
stabilization of international relations. Such treaties are to be
read in their entirety and the preamble is one of the crucial
factors.93 Such treaties are treated as law-making treaties
rather than mere contractual instruments. These treaties are
also referred to as constitutional or constitutive treaties.94 While
interpreting such treaties, the principles that need to be kept in
mind, according to the ICJ are:
UNCLOS, supra note 88, pmbl.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(2), May 23, 1969,
1151 U.N.T.S. 331.
91 See RICHARD K. GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 186–87 (2d ed., 2015)
(explaining how dictionaries and other sources of definitions influence treaty
interpretation).
92 Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly,
21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6516 (1966), reprinted in [1966] 2 Y.B.
Int’l L. Comm’n 219, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1. (explaining that
“the character of a treaty may affect the question whether the application of a
particular principle, maxim or method of interpretation is suitable in a
particular case.”).
93 Isabelle Van Damme, Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body,
21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 605, 629–30 (2010).
94 EIRIK BJORGE, THE EVOLUTIONARY INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES 106, 129
(2014).
89
90
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[T]he constituent instruments […] are also treaties of a particular
type; their object is to create new subjects of law endowed with a
certain autonomy, to which the parties entrust the task of
realizing common goals. Such treaties can raise specific problems
of interpretation owing, inter alia, to their character which is
conventional and at the same time institutional; the very nature
of the organization created, the objectives which have been
assigned to it by its founders, the imperatives associated with the
effective performance of its functions, as well as its own practice,
are all elements which may deserve special attention when the
time comes to interpret these constituent treaties.95

It would be appropriate to look at the preamble of UNCLOS
to determine the objectives of the treaty. UNCLOS aims to
comprehensively deal with the subject of the law of the sea
because it aims at settling “all issues relating to the law of the
sea.”96 Moreover, UNCLOS is seen as an instrument to achieve
international peace and security.97 Therefore, the target of
UNCLOS as per the preamble is to make “an important
contribution to the maintenance of peace, justice and progress
for all peoples of the world.” 98 The fundamental objective of
UNCLOS according to the preamble is to maintain the legal
order of the seas.99 The preamble of UNCLOS declares this
intention by
Recognizing the desirability of establishing through this
Convention, with due regard for the sovereignty of all States, a
legal order for the seas and oceans which will facilitate
international communication, and will promote oceans which will
facilitate international communication, and will promote the
peaceful uses of the seas and oceans. 100

95 Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict,
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 66, ¶ 19 (July 8).
96 UNCLOS, supra note 88, pmbl.
97 UNCLOS has proven itself as valuable global framework for resolving
maritime
conflicts,
UNCLOSDEBATE,
https://www.unclosdebate.org/evidence/771/unclos-has-proven-itself-valuableglobal-framework-resolving-maritime-conflicts (last visited Apr. 6, 2022).
98 UNCLOS, supra note 88, pmbl. (“Prompted by the desire to settle, in a
spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation, all issues relating to the law
of the sea and aware of the historical significance of this Convention as an
important contribution to the maintenance of peace, justice and progress for
all peoples of the world.”).
99 UNCLOS, supra note 88, pmbl.
100 Id.
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Moreover, a terrorist vessel commits violent acts when it
uses the sea for terrorist activities such as criminal actions
aimed at creating a sense of fear in the minds of general public.
Therefore, the presence of a terrorist vessel and the use of the
sea and oceans by a terrorist vessel is an anathema to the
objective of promoting peaceful use of the sea. And, to promote
peaceful use of the sea, suppression of the use of sea for terrorist
activities is necessary. Any activity by states must be within the
sphere of these objectives. Using the sea for terrorist activities
is against the objectives of UNLCOS and a coastal state would
be well within its rights to stop any such use.
UNCLOS must also be interpreted in the background of
general international law and binding obligations of states
emanating thereunder. Particularly, UNCLOS has to operate
within the framework of general international law and the UN
Charter. Maintenance of international peace and security is the
foundational principle of the UN Charter.101 A multilateral
treaty, like UNCLOS, also has to be interpreted in an
evolutionary manner, taking into consideration the
developments in the field and keeping in mind the challenges of
changing times that the treaty ought to resolve.102 Evolutionary
interpretation is embedded in Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties because it understands that
relevant rules of international law must be taken into
consideration while interpreting a treaty.103 Explaining the role
of evolutionary interpretation, the ICJ in the Namibia Advisory
Opinion, stated that “an international instrument has to be
interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire legal
system prevailing at the time of the interpretation.”104 In the
Navigation Rights Case, the ICJ gave the following reasons for
U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 6.
See generally Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶¶ 27–28
(July 9) (discussing the evolutionary nature of the General Assembly
procedures in seeking an advisory opinion); Stefan Kadelbach, Interpretation
of the Charter, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 71, 74
(Oxford Univ. Press ed., 3rd ed. 2012).
103 David McKeever, Evolving Interpretation of Multilateral Treaties: ‘Acts
Contrary to the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations’ in the Refugee
Convention, 64 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 405, 407 (2015).
104 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶ 53 (June 21).
101
102
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the adoption of an evolutionary approach:
On the other hand, there are situations in which the parties’ intent
upon conclusion of the treaty was, or may be presumed to have
been, to give the terms used — or some of them — a meaning or
content capable of evolving, not one fixed once and for all, so as to
make allowance for, among other things, developments in
international law. In such instances it is indeed in order to respect
the parties’ common intention at the time the treaty was
concluded, not to depart from it, that account should be taken of
the meaning acquired by the terms in question upon each occasion
on which the treaty is to be applied.105

Rules on suppression of terrorism adopted by binding
Security Council Resolutions have changed general
international law and are therefore a relevant consideration for
interpretation. Evolutionary interpretation would not warrant
inclusion of new provisions or addressing situations that do not
exist in the treaty. However, if there is adequate support for
covering situations based on the general philosophy reflected in
the preamble and coverage under provisions of the treaty, then
a constitutional treaty should be interpreted in an evolutionary
manner. Like any other branch of law, international law of the
sea is not static. It embodies and attempts to interpret and
reflect the legal order of the oceans, which change and evolve in
response to the challenges required by the need to secure and
maintain an orderly use of the oceans. There need not be direct
reference to suppression of terrorist actions arising from the sea,
as long as the scope of the provisions in UNCLOS is extensive
enough to accommodate undertaking necessary actions for the
suppression of terrorist threats emanating from the sea. For
example, a coastal state can undertake various regulations
based on provisions in UNCLOS.106 José Luis Jesus has
remarked that:
For any system of law to be able to respond to the needs of society,
it has to be able to change and adapt to the changing
circumstances affecting the relations or the reality it purports to
discipline and regulate. It should reflect the mood of new times
and situations, absorb new requirements and dominant trends and
adopt measures to prevent or repress negative developments that
105 Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v.
Nicar.), Judgment, 2009 I.C.J. 213, ¶ 64 (July 13).
106 UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 21.
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pose a serious threat.107

The provisions of UNCLOS must be interpreted in a way
that keeps in mind the underlying philosophy of maintaining the
legal order of the sea. Therefore, there it is appropriate for the
coastal states to take measures to tackle the threat of a terrorist
attack in situations (e) and (f) even though UNCLOS does not
have any specific provision dealing with such a terrorist threat.
Since maintenance of international peace and security is one of
the fundamental objectives of UNCLOS,108 the developments in
the field of countering terrorism, and maritime terrorism in
particular, are necessarily part of that objective. UNCLOS
creates maritime zones on which different degrees of control and
influence can be exercised by a coastal state. Depending on the
maritime zone under consideration, the manner in which the
threat of a terrorist attack from a terrorist vessel can be
addressed is determined. In all these zones a coastal state can
exercise powers to neutralize a terrorist vessel. Specific regimes
in different maritime zones are discussed hereunder.
B. Territorial Sea
Territorial sea is an area “not exceeding 12 nautical miles,
measured from baselines,” which are determined in accordance
with UNCLOS.109 Sovereignty of a coastal state extends to these
territorial waters.110 Sovereignty over the territorial sea is
extensive and comparable to the degree of control exercised on
land territory, subject to limitations under UNCLOS and other
rules of international law.111 The coastal state is free to regulate
the activity of the territorial sea in a manner it deems
appropriate,112 and has the power to suppress all criminal
activities including terrorist activities on the territorial sea. The
powers exercised by the coastal state on the territorial seas are
akin to those exercised on the land territory, as long as they do
not contradict the right of innocent passage conferred on other
107 José Luis Jesus, Protection of Foreign Ships against Piracy and
Terrorism at Sea: Legal Aspects, 18 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 363, 381–82
(2003).
108 See UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 138.
109 UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 3.
110 Id. art. 2(1).
111 Id. art. 3.
112 Id. art. 2.
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states under UNCLOS.113 A coastal state can take action
against a terrorist vessel based on the provisions governing the
activities on the territorial sea.114
The limitation on the exercise of absolute sovereignty of
the coastal state in the territorial sea is in the form of the right
of “innocent passage” of vessels belonging to other states. 115 To
exercise this right, the conditions of innocent passage have to be
satisfied by vessels belonging to other states. If any vessel –
including a terrorist vessel – does not satisfy the conditions of
innocent passage, then a coastal state would be within its
powers to stop passage of that vessel and undertake necessary
measures. Prior to the codification of UNCLOS, the 1958
Territorial Sea Convention covered this field.116 That convention
referred to innocent passage but did not specify the elements of
innocent passage. One of the areas of achievement where
UNCLOS has made impressive progress in codification over the
1958 Territorial Sea Convention is setting out the ingredients of
innocent passage in detail.117 Although rather intuitive, the two
necessary elements of “innocent passage” are that (1) the
passing of the vessel should satisfy the conditions of “passage”
and (2) that “passage” shall be innocent. UNCLOS defines both
these elements.
Article 18 of UNCLOS defines “passage” as navigation
through territorial sea for traversing the sea with or without
entering territorial waters or calling at a roadstead or port
facility by entering territorial waters or simply from outside. 118
If the terrorist vessel does not pass through the territorial sea,
then legal provisions regulating other maritime zones discussed
in the following sections would control. If the terrorist vessel
enters territorial sea – which it is bound to – it will be outside
the scope of “passage.”119 If the destination of the terrorist vessel
is the coastal state, it is not simply traversing. And the
R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 75 (3rd. ed. 1999).
Id.
115 UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 17.
116 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, BRITANNICA ,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Convention-on-the-Territorial-Sea-andContiguous-Zone (last visited Mar. 29, 2022).
117 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, art. 14 (3)–
(4), Apr. 9, 1958, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter UNCTSCZ].
118 UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 18.
119 Id. art. 19.
113
114
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“[p]assage shall be continuous and expeditious,”120 so ships are
not allowed to hover or cruise around in territorial waters.121
The freedom of passage is available only for ships that are
passing through and not for those who intend to dock on the port
or otherwise for whatever reasons.122 A vessel may stop and
anchor only to the extent that it is incidental to ordinary
navigation, or necessary due to force majeure or distress or
rendering assistance to persons or ships or aircraft in danger or
distress.123 It seems clear that a terrorist vessel would not stop
in the territorial sea for any of these reasons, but even if it did
stop, it would only be temporary and in furtherance of its aim at
reaching the land territory of the coastal state. It is not passing
or transiting from the territorial sea for its onward voyage. It is
traversing the territorial sea to enter the coastal state.
Satisfaction of the “passage” conditions is also required for
satisfaction of “innocent passage.”124 So long as a vessel’s
passage is not “prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of
the coastal State,” then they have satisfied “innocent
passage.”125 This provision is described as a ‘“catch-all clause”126
since it expands the scope of jurisdiction of the coastal state to
take actions that do not relate to passage. The nature of this
clause is such that even if the passage is lawful, it would become
non-innocent.127 A terrorist vessel, in its very nature, does not
satisfy the requirements of “passage” or “innocent passage.”
Since a terrorist act involves violence, it is contrary to peace.
Throughout the various stages prior to the creation of
UNCLOS, security of the coastal state has been a fundamental
criterion for satisfying the test of innocent passage.128 At the
first Law of the Sea Conference, it was proposed that “the sole
test of innocence of a passage was whether or not it was
Id. art. 18(2).
CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 113, at 82.
122 UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 18(2).
123 Id.
124 UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 19(1)–(2).
125 Id. art. 19(1).
126 Sarah Wolf, Territorial Sea, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIAS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 25 (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 2013).
127 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 616 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts
eds., 9th ed. 1992).
128
See U.N. CLOS, 8th Sess., 26th mtg. at 82, U.N. Doc
A/CONF.13/C.1/SR.26-30 (Mar. 27, 1958).
120
121
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prejudicial to the security of the coastal State.”129 There was
disagreement about the precise extent of protection
contemplated under the word “security” and the kinds of
protection included.130 But there was agreement that national
defense was included in the meaning of the word “security.”131
Again, the 1958 Territorial Seas Convention stipulated that for
a passage to be innocent, it must not be prejudicial to the peace,
good order or security of the coastal state.132 And the same
sentiment is contained in Article 19 of UNCLOS.133 The word
“security” in Article 19 is broad and cannot be limited to any
particular kind of security interest. It is not limited to military
security and covers a wide range of issues.134 Maritime security
is inevitably included and therefore maritime terrorism is
contrary to the understanding of “security” under this provision.
UNCLOS provides for certain activities that are “prejudicial
to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State.”135
Specifically, a vessel cannot indulge in an activity causing “any
threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial
integrity or political independence of the coastal State, or in any
other manner in violation of the principles of international law
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.”136
The language of this clause suggests that a vessel is
restrained from not only the actual use of force but also the
threat of use of force. The language used in this provision of
UNCLOS is the same as Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.137
Therefore, a conclusion between these two provisions can be
drawn. For there to be a “threat” there is no need for an armed
attack or a serious form of use of force or limited confrontation
Id.
Id. at 83.
131 See id. (stating that security implies that there should be no military
or other threats to the sovereignty of the coastal state).
132 UNCTSCZ, supra note 117, art. 14(4); Gerald Fitzmaurice, Some
Results of the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: Part 1 – the Territorial
Sea and Contiguous Zone and Related Topics, 8 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 78, 95
(1959).
133 UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 19(1); Fitzmaurice, supra note 132.
134 Stuart Kaye, Freedom of Navigation in a Post 9/11 World: Security and
Creeping Jurisdiction, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 349
(David Freestone, et al. eds., 2010).
135 UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 19(1).
136 Id. 19(2).
137 U.N. Charter art. 2(4).
129
130
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between armies, it virtually includes any military operations.138
In the case of a terrorist attack, such a confrontation would not
be involved. In the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind, the International Law Commission stated
that “the word “threat” denotes acts undertaken with a view to
making a State believe that force will be used against it if certain
demands are not met by that State.”139
Threat of force according to the ICJ is “the stated readiness
to use it.”140 There should be good reason to believe that an
attack is contemplated.141 Romana Sadurska has defined a
threat as “an act that is designed to create a psychological
condition in the target of apprehension, anxiety and eventually
fear, which will erode the target’s resistance to change or will
pressure it toward preserving the status quo.”142 And Marco
Roscini has defined use of force as “an explicit or implicit
promise of a future and unlawful use of armed force against one
or more states, the realization of which depends on the
threatener’s will.”143 The seriousness of the action and whether
it would amount to threat of force would depend on the “context”
in which it occurred.144 In the case of UNCLOS, there is a
general reference to “threat” to the coastal state. Therefore, it
would be cumbersome on the language of the treaty to interpret
that the threat has to emanate from a non-state actor. A coastal
state could take action against a threat even by state actors. A
terrorist vessel threatens to use force because it is in the process
of using force against the coastal state.
A passage is not innocent if the vessel commits “any act
aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or
security of the coastal State.”145 The primary aim, however, of a
138 OLIVIER CORTEN, THE LAW AGAINST WAR: THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE
FORCE IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 52 (Hart Pub. ed., 2010).
139 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, [1989]
2 Y.B. Int’l Comm’n 68, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1989/Add.1.
140 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 95, ¶ 47 (July 8).
141 Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind,
[1950] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 277–78, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/25.
142 Romana Sadurska, Threat of Use of Force, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 239, 241
(1988).
143 Marco Roscini, Threats of Armed Force and Contemporary International
Law, 54 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 229, 235 (2007).
144 CORTEN, supra note 138, at 73.
145 UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 19(2)(c).
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terrorist vessel covered under situations (e) and (f) would not be
at collecting information. Instead, in these situations where a
terrorist vessel is on such an expedition, the information
collection will still pose a threat to the peace, good order, and
security because the terrorist attack is still in motion but only in
a planning stage.
A vessel would be acting prejudicial to the peace, good order,
or security of the coastal state if it indulges into “any act of
propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or security of the
coastal State.”146 Again, the primary purpose of a terrorist vessel
may not be to indulge into such an activity. But the possibility
of propagation of use of terrorist activities or use of force against
the coastal state cannot be ruled out.
Most often, a terrorist vessel enters a coastal state in a
clandestine manner without any authorization. Even if it seeks
authorization, it obtains that authorization by deceit thereby
discrediting its legal validity. They also manifestly violate
immigration laws. And terrorists typically carry ammunition
which violates the customs regulations of the coastal state.
Often terrorists carry fake currencies147 and violate fiscal
laws.148 All these actions are contrary to the peace, good order,
or security of the coastal state as seen through UNCLOS that
lists “the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or
person contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary
laws and regulations of the coastal State” as prohibited
conduct.149
If a vessel commits “any act aimed at interfering with any
systems of communication or any other facilities or installations
of the coastal State” then the action is contrary to the peace, good

Id. art. 19(2)(d).
FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, FAFT REPORT: MONEY LAUNDERING AND
TERRORIST FINANCING RELATED TO COUNTERFEITING OF CURRENCY 30 (2013),
https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/money-launderingterrorist-financing-related-to-counterfeit-currency.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
BUREAU OF INT’L NARCOTICS & L. ENF’T AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT: MONEY LAUNDERING AND FINANCIAL CRIMES 109
(2021), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/21-00620-INLSRVol2_Report-FINAL.pdf.
148 KRISTEN E. BOON ET AL., TERRORISM: COMMENTARY ON SECURITY
DOCUMENTS: TERRORIST FINANCING AND MONEY-LAUNDERING 379–80 (Oxford
Uni. Press ed., vol. 106, 2010).
149 UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 19(2)(g).
146
147
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order, and security of the coastal state.150 In some situations, to
escape identification by coast guards, terrorist vessels may use
devices that interfere with the communication systems or other
facilities of the coastal state. In which case, again, the passage
of a terrorist vessel would not be innocent.
According to the ICJ in the Corfu Channel Case, the decision
of whether the passage is innocent would depend on the
“manner” in which the ship passes through the territorial sea.151
For example, the manner in which a terrorist vessel travels
through territorial waters before or after committing a terrorist
attack would be prejudicial to the peace and security.152
Although the elements of innocent passage are set out in
Articles 18 and 19 of UNCLOS,153 some additional practices have
developed in the application of these provisions.154 Many states
have imposed conditions on passage through territorial
waters.155 They insist on prior notification by warships. 156 These
provisions, however, do not apply to commercial vessels. 157 It is
unclear how a terrorist vessel would characterize itself. 158
Normally a terrorist vessel would be traversing in a clandestine
manner and evading disclosures to the coastal authorities.159
Thus, it would not be complying with the requirement of
intimation and even if it does intimate, the information provided
would be false.
Id. art. 19(2)(k).
Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 30–31 (Apr. 9).
152 UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 19(1).
153 UNCLOS, supra note 88, arts. 18–19.
154 FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW & DIPLOMACY, LAW OF THE SEA: A POLICY
PRIMER 22 (John Burgess et al., eds., 2017) [hereinafter LAW OF THE SEA: A
POLICY PRIMER].
155 UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 21(1) (providing an exhaustive list on how
coastal states can limit passage through territorial waters).
156 LAW OF THE SEA: A POLICY PRIMER, supra note 154.
157 Simon O. Williams, Maritime Security: The Concept of Innocent
Passage, MARITIME EXEC. (Dec. 17, 2014, 3:38 PM), https://www.maritimeexecutive.com/features/Maritime-Security-Private-The-Concept-of-InnocentPassage.
158 See, e.g., George W. Bush, The National Strategy for Maritime Security,
WHITE
HOUSE
(Dec.
17,
2014),
https://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/homeland/maritime-security.html#section2 (listing
the various types of vessels used to carry out terroristic threats).
159 See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING
TERRORIST AND OTHER ILLICIT FINANCING 10, 18, 23–24 (2020) (illustrating the
different ways that terrorists and other criminals evade the authorities).
150
151
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While imposing regulations on the passage of vessels, all
that UNCLOS expects is that innocent passage would not be
hampered contrary to the objectives of UNCLOS. 160 Restrictions
cannot be imposed that would have the practical effect of
impairing innocent passage.161 The crucial limitation on the
power of the coastal state is that it shall not “discriminate in
form or in fact” against ships of any state or ships carrying
cargo.162 The regulations that a coastal state imposes and the
actions that it would take have to be non-discriminatory.163
Exercise of jurisdiction by the coastal state serves not only
national interest of the coastal state but also performs policing
function in combating international terrorism.164 Since port
state jurisdiction complements the flag state jurisdiction, the
port state can contribute towards ensuring compliance with
international regulatory efforts.165
Ordinarily, a ship passing through the territorial sea would
be required to comply with laws and regulations relating to
navigation and transport.166 It is universally recognized that a
coastal state has exclusive jurisdiction within the territorial sea
over matters of police and control.167 If there is no passage or
not an innocent passage then the ship would be subject to all
coastal state laws.168 Except for the situations mentioned under
Article 27 of UNCLOS, the jurisdiction of the coastal state would
be absolute.169 Article 27 stipulates conditions for exercise of
criminal jurisdiction of a coastal state on a foreign ship passing
through territorial waters.170 As a general rule, criminal
UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 24.
Id. art. 24(1)(a).
162 Id. art. 25(3).
163 Id. art. 227.
164 See, e.g., U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, MARITIME CRIME: A M ANUAL FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE PRACTITIONERS 10 (2019) (illustrating how maritime law
enforcement agencies are simultaneously concerned with obligations under
international law).
165 Simon O. Williams, Maritime Security: State Jurisdiction Over PCASP,
MARITIME EXEC. (Dec. 9, 2014, 9:13 AM), https://www.maritimeexecutive.com/article/Maritime-Security-State-Jurisdiction-Over-PCASP2014-12-09.
166 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 127, at 617.
167 Id. at 620.
168 CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 113, at 95.
169 Id.
170 UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 27(1).
160
161
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jurisdiction of a coastal state would not extend over a ship
passing through the territorial sea.171 A coastal state could
exercise criminal jurisdiction “if the consequences of the crime
extend to the coastal State”172 or “if the crime is of a kind to
disturb the peace of the country or the good order of the
territorial sea.”173 The criminal jurisdiction of the coastal state
would extend to a foreign vessel except for matters solely
involving internal discipline of the vessel.174 The terrorist vessel
would be committing crimes in the territory of the coastal state
and the principal aim of a terrorist vessel is of disturbing the
peace and good order.175 In a situation where the terrorist vessel
intends to enter the coastal state to commit a terrorist act or is
returning after having committed such an act, the situation
would be covered and the coastal state would have criminal
jurisdiction.176 The challenge is when the terrorists disembark
on the shore of the coastal state and then cross over to another
state through land to commit a terrorist attack or are returning
after having committed a terrorist act.177 In this situation the
terrorist vessel is not indulging into a terrorist activity against
the coastal state or in the territorial waters of the coastal
state.178 This situation does not fall within either of the two
situations under which criminal jurisdiction could be exercised
by the coastal state.179 However, in view of the general obligation
on all states to take action against perpetrators of terrorist acts
under resolutions of the Security Council and General Assembly,
the coastal state could exercise criminal jurisdiction.180 And by
failing to exercise that jurisdiction, the coastal state would be
Id. art. 27(5).
Id. art. 27(1)(a).
173 Id. art. 27(1)(b).
174 YOSHIFUMI TANAKA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 79 (Cambridge
Univ. Press ed., 2012).
175 BJORN MOLLER, PIRACY, MARITIME TERRORISM AND NAVAL STRATEGY 23
(Danish Inst. for Int'l Stud., ed., 2d ed. 2009).
176 MOLLER, supra note 175, at 15.
177 See, e.g., Kunayil, supra note 28, at 75 (highlighting the Mumbai
terrorist attack which began on the sea and transitioned to land when the
terrorists disembarked).
178 UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 27(5).
179 Id. art. 27(1).
180 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 49/60, supra note 48 (calling on all states to combat
terrorism); see, e.g., S.C. Res. 2249, supra note 46 (reaffirming state's
commitment to combatting all forms of terrorism).
171
172
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violating mandatory Security Council Resolutions.181
The range of measures that a coastal state can adopt to
control the movements of a terrorist vessel in the territorial
waters are far-reaching. UNCLOS allows the coastal state to
take all necessary steps to prevent passage which is not
innocent.182 The traversing of territorial sea by a terrorist vessel
is prejudicial to the peace, good order, and security of the coastal
state, and therefore it could be intercepted, and appropriate
actions may be taken against it.183 And the coastal states are
further supported by their own criminal jurisdiction which
applies to a terrorist vessel.184
The manner of terrorist attacks in India, for example, has
shown that a terrorist vessel would normally not land on a
port.185 They prefer to land unnoticed and that is possible
through the use of smaller boats, but as time has passed, even
those smaller vessels have been noticed and are normally used
to ferry terrorists or ammunition. 186 If terrorists do approach a
port, it is much easier for the coastal state to take action against
such a vessel.187 In fact, complete sovereignty extends over
ports.188 Because a port is defined as the outermost permanent
harbor, “works which form an integral part of the harbor system
are regarded as forming part of the coast.”189 The consequence
of the sovereign right of a coastal state on the port is that it can

See S.C. Res. 2249, supra note 46 (describing the commitment that all
states take in combatting terrorism).
182 See UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 25(1) (providing that “[t]he coastal
State may take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage
which is not innocent.”).
183 Id. arts. 19(1)–(2).
184 UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 27(1)(b) (stating that the criminal
jurisdiction of a coastal state would apply if a crime that disturbs the peace of
the country is committed).
185 See Vaibhav Tiwari, Terror Alert For South India Based On Boats
Found In Gujarat's Sir Creek, NDTV (Sept. 10, 2019, 4:57
AM), https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/army-warns-of-terror-attack-insouthern-india-after-boats-found-abandoned-2098087
(describing
recent
terrorists in India abandoned their boats outside of the ports).
186 ABHIJIT SINGH, MARITIME TERRORISM IN ASIA: AN ASSESSMENT 7
(Observer Rsch. Found. ed., 2019).
187 UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 11 (describing the control that coastal
states have over their ports).
188 Id. art. 2.
189 Id. art. 11.
181
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control which vessels enter and under what conditions.190 States
can regulate activities on the port to protect various interests of
the state and maritime security is one of them. 191 States can
always exercise jurisdiction over ships that voluntarily enter the
port.192 States enjoy extensive sovereign powers over the port
including the right to close a port for foreign shipping.193 A ship
that enters the port is subject to civil and criminal jurisdiction
of the port state.194 A coastal state would be perfectly within its
right to deny access to a terrorist vehicle to its port whether the
terrorist vehicle intends to commit a terrorist act in that state
or any other state.
C. Contiguous Zone
The maritime zone adjacent to the territorial sea is the
contiguous zone.195 It is adjacent to the territorial sea and “may
not extend beyond [twenty-four] nautical miles from the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured.”196 The concept of a contiguous zone was developed
to address the menace of smuggling ships that hovered beyond
the territorial sea.197 Since the smuggling ships were beyond the
territorial sea, they were outside the national jurisdiction of the
coastal state. An additional adjacent area was claimed by states
to exercise preventive and punitive jurisdiction over activities in
adjacent waters but beyond the territorial sea.198 The scope of
authority exercised by a coastal state in the contiguous zone is
lesser as compared to that exercised in the territorial sea.199 In
190 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 111, ¶ 213 (June 27) (stating that “It is
also by virtue of its sovereignty that the coastal State may regulate access to
its ports”).
191 John T. Oliver, Legal and Policy Factors Governing the Imposition of
Conditions on Access to and Jurisdiction Over Foreign-Flag Vessels in US
Ports, 5 S.C. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 209, 246–47 (2009).
192 Tullio Treves, High Seas, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIAS OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 29 (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 2008).
193 KLEIN, supra note 7, at 67.
194 UNCLOS, supra note 88, arts. 27(2), 33(1).
195 Id. art. 33(1).
196 Id. art. 33(2).
197 Id. art. 33(1).
198 CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 113, at 132.
199 Compare UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 27(2) (stating that coastal States
have the right to take any steps authorized by its laws to pursue an arrest on
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the contiguous zone, the coastal state can exercise control to
prevent and punish infringement of customs, fiscal,
immigration, or sanitary laws and regulations within its
territory or territorial sea.200 Coastal states enjoy enforcement
jurisdiction over the contiguous zone on limited subjects. 201 As
in Article 19(2)(g), impeding the peace, good order, and security
of a coastal state are the circumstances under which a coastal
state can interfere with a vessel in the contiguous zone. 202 And
as seen above, under this clause a terrorist vessel violates
customs, fiscal, and immigration laws. Therefore, a coastal state
can take action against a terrorist vessel in the contiguous zone
as well.
The Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”) subsumes the area of
the contiguous zone.203 EEZ is defined as an area beyond and
adjacent to the territorial sea.204 It extends up to 200 nautical
miles from the baseline.205 Therefore, the powers exercised by
the coastal state on the EEZ also apply to contiguous zones, as
discussed below.
D. Continental Shelf
The continental shelf of a coastal state contains the seabed
and subsoil of the submarine area.206 It extends beyond the
territorial sea as a natural prolongation of its land territory to
the outer edge of the continental margin or up to a distance of
200 nautical miles from the baseline from where the breadth of
the territorial sea is measured. 207 The coastal state has
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting
a foreign ship passing through territorial waters after leaving internal waters),
with UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 33(1) (explaining that a coastal state is
limited to preventing violations of customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary
laws in its contiguous zone).
200 UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 33(1).
201 TANAKA, supra note 174, at 122–23.
202 See UNCLOS, supra note 88, arts. 19, 33 (acknowledging that the state
may prevent infringement of territorial laws).
203 UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 48; see also Maritime Zones and
Boundaries, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. OFF. GEN. COUNCIL (Sept.
3, 2021), https://www.gc.noaa.gov/gcil_maritime.html#contiguous (explaining
how each coastal state can claim an EEZ).
204 UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 55.
205 Id. art. 57.
206 Id. art. 76(1).
207 Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol34/iss2/1

32

Spring 2022 Maritime Security & Threat of a Terrorist Act 33
natural resources in this area.208 The rights of the coastal state
are limited to these rights and do not affect the other rights
enjoyed by other states over the super adjacent waters and the
air space above them.209 The continental shelf is a reference to
rights over the subsoil and seabed rather than the activities
undertaken on the surface of the water.210 The activities on the
water would be operated by the rules regulating territorial sea,
up to twelve nautical miles from the baseline, and EEZ, up to
200 nautical miles.211 It would be appropriate to refer to the
permissible scope for taking action against a terrorist vessel in
these areas.
E. Exclusive Economic Zones
The EEZ is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial
waters.212 It does not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the
baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured.213 Coastal states enjoy sovereign rights over these
areas for exploration and exploitation, conservation and
management of natural resources, creation of artificial islands,
installations and structures, marine scientific research,
protection of marine environment and other rights and duties
under UNCLOS.214 Coastal states have to ensure that they use
the exclusive economic zone with “due regard” to the rights of
other states.215 The rights of coastal states do not affect the
rights of other states’ freedom of navigation, overflight by
aircraft, laying of cables and pipelines, and other internationally
useful uses of the sea.216 These rights are subject to the “due
regard” rule.217 “Due regard” applies both to coastal states and
other states. The coastal state has to ensure that it uses the
exclusive economic zone with due regard to the rights of other
states and at the same time other states have to use that area
Id. art. 77(1).
Id. art. 78(1).
210 Id. art. 76(1).
211 Id.
212 UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 55.
213 Id. art. 57.
214 Id. art. 56(1).
215 Id. art. 56(2).
216 Id. art. 58(1).
217 Id. art. 58(3).
208
209
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with “due regard” to the rights of the coastal state. The details
of the due regard rule are discussed in the next section.
The extent of rights enjoyed by coastal states in the
exclusive economic zone are not as frugal as in the high seas or
as extensive as in the territorial sea. The scope of authority
exercised by coastal states’ EEZ lies between that exercised in
the high seas and territorial sea.218 During the drafting of
UNCLOS, some states argued that the EEZ should have a
residual high seas character, i.e. any activity not falling within
the clearly defined rights of coastal states under the part
relating to the EEZ would be subject to the regime of high seas.219
The suggestion was not accepted and Articles 55 and 86 of
UNCLOS make it clear that the EEZ does not have a residual
high seas character.220 Similarly, coastal states do not enjoy
residual territorial rights in the EEZ except for the rights
mentioned in the section relating to the EEZ. 221 Coastal states
cannot claim the same rights in the territorial sea as in the
EEZ.222 The EEZ is a separate functional zone with sui generis
character.223 Coastal states do not have territorial sovereignty
over the EEZ, but they enjoy sovereign rights including exclusive
legislative and enforcement jurisdiction over the EEZ.224
Therefore, coastal states can, for example, enforce domestic
legislations on suppression of terrorism in the EEZ and take
action against a terrorist vessel.
In situations where UNCLOS does not attribute rights or
jurisdiction to the coastal State or to other States within the
exclusive economic zone, and a conflict arises between the
interests of the coastal State and any other State or States, the
conflict should be resolved on the basis of equity and in the light
of all the relevant circumstances, taking into account the
respective importance of the interests involved to the parties as

218 UNCLOS, supra note 88, arts. 2–8, 24–28, 33, 55–63, 86–90 (outlining
states' authority in these distinct maritime zones).
219 Robert Beckman & Tara Davenport, The EEZ Regime: Reflections after
30 Years 6 (U.C. Berkeley Law of Sea Inst., Conference Paper, 2012).
220 UNCLOS, supra note 88, arts. 55, 86; see CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra
note 113, at 165.
221 UNCLOS, supra note 88, arts. 55–63.
222 LAW OF THE SEA: A POLICY PRIMER, supra note 154, at 12.
223 See CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 113, at 165–66.
224 TANAKA, supra note 174, at 128.
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well as to the international community as a whole.225

This provision grants residual rights to the coastal state in
the EEZ.226
It cannot be argued by a state that steps taken for
suppression of terrorist actions by a coastal state amount to
interference with its interests. Steps taken by a coastal state
would be in the interest of the entire international community
and hence justified. Other states could argue that steps taken
for suppression of terrorist actions amount to undue interference
with the right of navigation of those states, but that also would
not be an issue in cases of a terrorist attack, as discussed in this
article, because the vessels used are small. The coastal state
would be interjecting or taking action against these small
vessels rather than large containers that would suffer severe
financial loss if detained for any period of time.
Therefore, in effect, rights of the coastal state to restrict the
entry of a terrorist vessel and the right to take action under
other provisions of UNCLOS would continue to operate.
F. High Seas
The legal regime of the high seas has been prominently
characterized by the principles of freedom of usage and exclusive
jurisdiction of the flag state.227 The high seas are a common
heritage of mankind, and the freedom of navigation for all states
on the high seas is one of the oldest rules of international law,
coined and cemented by Hugo Grotius through his treaties
advocating the freedom of all states to use the high seas freely –
mare liberum.228 Therefore, the rights of coastal states over the
high seas are limited. Coastal states cannot prevent ships from
other states from using the high seas for peaceful purposes.229
The high seas under UNCLOS comprises “all parts of the sea
that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the

UNCLOS, supra note 64, art. 59.
TANAKA, supra note 174, at 131–32.
227 CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 113, at 203.
228 HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREE SEA xviii (David Armitage ed., Richard
Hakluyt trans., 2004).
229 CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 113, at 205 (explaining that “[s]tates
cannot in principle control the activities of other [s]tates on the high seas…
[because] the freedoms of the high seas cannot be exhaustively listed”).
225
226
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territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State.” 230
Sovereignty of the coastal state does not extend to the high seas
and very limited powers could be exercised by the coastal state.
The challenge then is how far can a coastal state take actions
against a terrorist vessel. It is also whether UNCLOS allows
undertaking of actions on the high seas against a terrorist vessel
and whether actions of the coastal state amount to interference
with freedom of navigation of other states.
All states, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy certain
freedoms on the high seas. Freedom on the high seas consists of
freedom from national jurisdiction.231 These freedoms include
freedom of navigation, over light, fishing, laying of submarine
cables and pipelines, construction of artificial islands and other
installations and the freedom of conducting scientific
research.232 The important freedom relevant to the present
discussion is the freedom of navigation. Freedom of navigation
means all states, whether coastal or land-locked, have the right
to sail ships flying their flag on the high seas. 233 Freedom of the
high seas, including the freedom of navigation, is neither
absolute nor unrestrained.234 All freedoms have to be exercised
“with due regard for the interests of other States.” 235 The “due
regard” or “reasonable regard” obligation, as it is now termed,
requires analysis on a case-by-case weighing of actual interests
involved to decide which use is reasonable.236 It is necessary
that the competing rights of states are balanced, taking into
account the essential principle of safeguarding life at sea.237 No
one would dispute that use of the high seas for violent purposes
would be a violation of the “due regard” obligation.238 It would
UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 86.
TANAKA, supra note 174, at 151.
232 UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 87(1).
233 UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 90.
234 See Id. art. 87(2) (explaining that the freedom to navigate the sea must
be exercised with due regard for other states' interests and rights under the
convention).
235 Id. art. 87(2).
236 CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 113, at 206.
237 Jan Jakub Solski, The ‘Due Regard’ of Article 234 of UNCLOS: Lessons
From Regulating Innocent Passage in the Territorial Sea, 52 OCEAN DEV. &
INT’L L. 398, 401 (2021).
238 KLEIN, supra note 7, at 53 ("[C]onflict should be resolved on the basis of
equity and in the light of all the relevant circumstances, taking into account
the respective importance of the interest involved to the parties as well as to
230
231
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be equitable for the coastal state to take steps that would limit
freedom of navigation of other states if the steps are taken to
prevent maritime terrorism.239 A coastal state would be within
its powers to stop and take counter action against a terrorist
vessel on the high seas because using the high seas for terrorist
activities is violation of the “due regard” principle.
Due regard has to be understood in the context of the aims
and objectives of the UNCLOS and compliance with its other
provisions. There are two additional provisions in UNCLOS in
relation to the high seas which do not accept use of the high seas
for terrorist activities. Article 88 reserves the high seas for
peaceful purposes in the following words: “The high seas shall
be reserved for peaceful purposes.” 240
The use of the high seas cannot happen in deviation of this
elementary principle. Anybody using the high seas for any
violent activity, thereby committing piracy, loses their freedoms
on the high seas including the freedom of navigation.241
UNCLOS imposes a general obligation on all states to use the
seas for peaceful purposes. 242 Article 301 states that the states
should not use the seas in any “manner inconsistent with the
principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the
United Nations.”243 This is a general provision applicable on all
maritime zones. While the coastal states are themselves under
an obligation not to use the high seas for peaceful purposes, they
can undertake steps to ensure that the seas are not used
contrary to the principles of the UN Charter. Therefore, coercive
measures undertaken by a coastal state for implementation of
police measures on the seas do not amount to use of force in
international law.244
Another aspect of the freedom of navigation of all states on
the high seas is the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state. Ships
have the nationality of the state whose flag they are entitled to
fly, and that state is the flag state. 245 Ships are subject to
the international community as a whole.").
239 Id.
240 UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 88.
241 UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 101.
242 Id. art. 88.
243 Id. art. 301.
244 CORTEN, supra note 138, at 56.
245 UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 91(1).
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exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state.246 Thus, the coastal state
or any other state is not authorized to interfere or exercise
jurisdiction over a ship on the high seas except the state where
the ship is registered. However, the exclusiveness of the flag
state is not absolute247 and UNCLOS recognizes certain
exceptions to this rule.248 UNCLOS allows a warship of a state
to board a vessel if there is a reasonable ground to suspect that
the ship is engaged in piracy, slave trade, unauthorized
broadcasting, lack of nationality, or the ship is flying a foreign
flag or refusing to show the flag although the ship is of the same
nationality as the warship.249 Two situations would be relevant
for interception of a terrorist vessel: piracy and ship without
nationality, a stateless vessel.
Piracy is one of the oldest crimes under customary
international law,250 which is now codified under UNCLOS.
Piracy includes any illegal act of violence, detention, or
depredation committed for private ends by the crew or
passengers of a private ship, or aircraft, against another ship, or
aircraft, or persons or property on board or on the high seas.251
It remains to be seen whether a terrorist act would be covered
under the crime of piracy since the definition is limited to the
requirement of “private ends.” Terrorist activities include those
aimed at destabilizing governments, causing unrest and threats
to blackmail governments, or for purported religious and ethnic
reasons, which include actions undertaken during liberation
movements or insurgents seizing ships for political reasons.
These activities, however, do not involve the essential element
of private ends.252 Pirates usually seek financial gain whereas
terrorists wish to make a political or ideological point.253
Id. art. 92(1).
See H.W. HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW: OR, RULES REGULATING THE
INTERCOURSE OF STATES IN PEACE AND WAR 593 (H.H. Bancroft & Co. ed., 1861)
(showing that exceptions to the absolute right of the flag state have been
recognized since the 19th century).
248 CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 113, at 209.
249 UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 110.
250 Michael Scharf & Mistale Taylor, A Contemporary Approach to the
Oldest International Crime, 33 UTRECHT J. INT’L & EUR. L. 77, 77 (2017).
251 UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 101.
252 Rüdiger Wolfrum, Fighting Terrorism at Sea: Options and Limitations
under International Law, in LEGAL CHALLENGES IN MARITIME SECURITY 2–3
(Brill ed., 2008).
253 See Helmut Tuerk, Combating Terrorism at Sea – The Suppression of
246
247
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Therefore, actions such as hijacking of a vessel for political ends
cannot qualify as an act of piracy.254
Despite the absence of strict private gains in terrorist
activities, some have argued that terrorist actions could be
covered under piracy. There is a link between piracy and
terrorism in some cases.255 The definition of piracy under
customary law, prior to its codification under the UNCLOS, is
broad. In Oppenheim’s International Law, piracy is defined as
“every unauthorized act of violence against persons or goods
committed on the open sea either by a private vessel against
another vessel or by the mutinous crew or passengers against
their own vessel.”256 According to the treatise, an act would
amount to piracy if a vessel is stopped to kill a passenger because
piracy involves any act of violence. There is no need for animus
furandi as piracy “may be prompted by hatred or revenge.”257
There is no need to actually commit piracy. A mere attempt is
adequate.258
An analogy could be drawn between piracy and terrorism on
the basis that both actions have been condemned by the
international community and each state is under an obligation
to ensure that they do not support commission of such actions in
their territory. Each state has to ensure that obligations to
suppress terrorism, which is a form of piracy, are effectively
implemented and turning a blind eye towards these obligations
is failure to suppress piracy.259 Likewise, under various binding
Security Council resolutions each state is under an obligation to
suppress terrorism, failure to do so would be a violation of the
UN Charter.
Scholars such as Malvina Halberstam insist that the acts of
terrorism are covered by piracy and ought to be treated so under
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 15 U. MIA. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 337, 342–43 (2008) (discussing the different goals of pirates and
terrorists).
254 Id. at 345 (stipulating that hijacking a vessel at sea for political reasons
cannot be considered an act of piracy).
255 UNRESOLVED ISSUES AND NEW CHALLENGES TO THE LAW OF THE SEA: TIME
BEFORE AND TIME AFTER 175 (Anastasia Strati et al., eds., 2006).
256 INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 608–09 (Herst Lauterpracht ed., 8th
ed. 1955).
257 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 127, at 752.
258 Id. at 752–53.
259 See Wolfrum, supra note 252, at 2, 3 (raising similar arguments in
relation to piracy and could be extended to terrorism).

39

40

PACE INT’L L. REV.

Vol. 34.2

UNCLOS.260 She argues that the use of “private ends” was not
intended to limit acts of piracy to acts done with the intention of
robbing (animus furandi).261 After referring extensively to the
drafting history, she convincingly argues that “for private ends”
was never intended to exclude terrorist acts.262 Exclusion of
“private ends” was added to exclude acts that were illegal
because the revolutionary organizations resorting to violence
had not been recognized as belligerent, otherwise they would
have been legal if they were so recognized.263
UNCLOS permits interdiction and boarding of a ship if
there is reasonable suspicion that the ship is without
nationality.264 According to international law and admiralty
laws of most host states, all vessels are to be registered with
some state and are subject to regulatory control of that state.265
In international law, all vessels must have nationality.266
Therefore, registration of a vessel with the flag state is
mandatory. A ship without nationality or a stateless vessel is a
ship that is not registered with any state. If such a vessel sets
sail, then there is no assurance under the law of the sea that it
would not be interdicted. Such vessels do not have a right to fare
freely on the high seas.267 Stateless vehicles do not enjoy any
protection under international law.268 Identification of vessels
with nationality is indispensable for maintaining order at the
See Malvina Halberstam, Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille
Lauro, Piracy and the IMO Convention on Maritime Safety, 82 AM. J. INT’L L.
269, 276 (1988) (discussing how terrorist attacks may also be characterized as
piracy).
261 Id. at 277.
262 See id. at 276–81 (explaining that the “for private ends” UNCLOS
definition was informed by the reasoning and scholarly debate surrounding
similar terms and definitions in the Geneva Convention, UN Convention on
the Law of the Sea, and the Harvard Draft Convention on Piracy).
263 Id. at 279–80.
264 UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 110(1)(d).
265 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS L. OF THE U.S. § 501
(Am. L. Inst. 1987) (connecting also to Comment (b) discussing the relationship
between a vessel and the registering state).
266 INTERNATIONAL LAW, 9 WHITEMAN DIGEST, ch. 25, § 1, at 21 (“The
registration of ships and the need to fly the flag of the country where the ship
is registered are considered essential for the maintenance of order on the open
sea.”).
267 United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1382 (11th Cir. 1982).
268 H. Edwin Anderson, III, The Nationality of Ships and Flags of
Convenience: Economics, Politics and Alternatives, 21 TUL. MAR. L.J. 139, 142
(1996).
260
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sea.269 According to Oppenheim’s International Law “[i]n the
interest of order on the open sea, a vessel not sailing under the
maritime flag of a State enjoys no protection whatever, for the
freedom of navigation on the open sea is freedom for such vessels
only as sail under the flag of a State.”270 As such, stateless
vessels are not entitled to any protection under international
law.271 All states are required, under international law, to make
every private vessel sailing under their flag to carry papers on
board that would assist in identification.272 Stateless vessel is
an anathema to international law and if there is such a vessel,
then any State can exercise jurisdiction over such a vessel.273
States generally have two kinds of registrations: closed
registries and open registries. Most of the states have closed
registries, whereby only nationals or an entity predominantly
composed of nationals of that state can obtain registration.274
Open registries are those where the state of registration places
minimal or no restrictions on vessels that can fly their flag. Any
vessel can obtain a registration with such states. The flags that
they fly are of convenience.275 The issue becomes complex if a
terrorist vessel is registered with an open registry.276 In any
case, there is a need of ‘genuine link’ between the vessel and its
state of registration.277 Article 5 of the Convention on High Seas
recognized this requirement. This requirement was continued
under Article 91 of UNCLOS.
According to ITLOS, “the need for a genuine link between a
ship and its flag State is to secure more effective implementation
MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE
OCEANS: A CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 1084 (Yale Univ.
Press ed., 1962).
270 INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 422 (Ronald F. Roxburgh ed., 3rd ed.,
1920).
271 Anderson, supra note 209.
272 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 127, at 734.
273 David F. Matlin, Re-evaluating the Status of Flags of Convenience
Under International Law, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1017, 1025–26 (1991).
274 Matlin, supra note 273, at 1039–42.
275 Id. at 1019–20.
276 For the practice of open registries and problems associated therewith,
see Anderson, supra note 209, at 158–68; Matlin, supra note 214, at 1042–43.
277 Regime of the High Seas, [1956] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 71, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1956; see also D. P. O’Connell, The History of the Law of the Sea,
in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 761 (1st ed. 1982) (during negotiations
of UNCLOS, genuine link was understood to precede eligibility for
registration).
269
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of the duties of the flag State.”278 These provisions ensure that
all vessels have a link with the state of registration. If they do
not, then the vessel would be treated as a stateless vessel. Thus,
a terrorist vehicle without genuine link to the flag state would
be violating international law and could be interjected by any
state, including the coastal state.
In case of a closed registry, the vessel would be under the
jurisdiction of the state of registration. Assuming that such a
vessel is registered with some state, the moment it indulges into
a terrorist activity it would lose its nationality.279 Also, since the
Security Council through resolution 1373 has urged states not
to provide active or passive support to terrorism, a coastal state
would not be justified in continuing registration of such a
terrorist vessel. All states are under an obligation to suppress
terrorism. A terrorist vessel would lose its registration by
operation of law because it has acted contrary to the aims and
objectives and provisions of UNCLOS such as Articles 88 and
301. Registration allows freedom of navigation subject to
peaceful use of oceans. Once a vessel indulges into activities
contrary to the peaceful use, it would have gone beyond the
contours of registration and deemed to be deregistered.
Deregistration of a vessel indulging into a terrorist activity
would happen in case of vessels registered with a state having
closed registries or in case of open registries where the link
between the vessel and the state of registration is not genuine.
The manner in which terrorist vessels have been used for
committing terrorist attacks shows that ‘small vessels’ are used
to commit these acts. But a small vessel is exempted from
registration with a flag state under UNCLOS.280
UNCLOS exempts small vessels from registration but does
not define small vessels or stipulate criteria for its
identification.281
Different criteria are applied under
international instruments and domestic law: based on size or
weight of the vessel. If the definition is based on the length, then
normally it is defined as a vessel smaller than twenty-four

278 M/V Saiga (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), Case No. 2, Judgment of July
1, 1999, ITLOS Rep. ¶ 83.
279 Wolfrum, supra note 252, at 15–16.
280 UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 94.
281 See id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol34/iss2/1

42

Spring 2022 Maritime Security & Threat of a Terrorist Act 43
meters.282 In the U.S., a small vessel is defined as a vessel that
is smaller than 300 gross tons.283 And there are concerns being
raised about the possible misuse of this provision with respect to
small vessels committing terrorist acts.284 The experience of
past discussed in the introduction amply demonstrates that
terrorists prefer small vessels due to their strategic and practical
benefit. Terrorists can also escape prior detection by not
registering the vessels and claiming them to be exempt from
registration. Especially since small vessels are a convenient
mode for transport even for long distances in the sea.
Based on this, UNCLOS has to be interpreted in a balanced
manner. The freedom of navigation does not authorize use of
high seas for terrorist activities. All freedoms associated with
the high seas are regulated.
The 1955 Report of the
International Law Commission prepared for the First UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea stated that:
Any freedom that is to be exercised in the interests of all entitled
to enjoy it, must be regulated. Hence, the law of the seas contains
certain rules, most of them already recognized in positive
international law, which are designed not to limit or restrict the
freedom of the high seas, but to safeguard its exercise in the
interests of the international community.285

Using the high seas for terrorist acts is contrary to the ethos
and principles of UNCLOS.
G. Regime under other international instruments
Different aspects of maritime security are covered under
various binding and non-binding international instruments.
The Convention for Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against Safety
282 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation
and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas art. II, 1993,
(S. Treaty Doc. No. 103–24); Merchant Shipping Act 1995, c. 21, §1(2) (UK);
Shipping Registration Act 1981 (Cth) 13 (Austl.).
283 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (DHS), REPORT OF THE DHS
NATIONAL SMALL VESSEL SECURITY SUMMIT 11 (Homeland Security Institute
ed., 2007); FEDERAL LAW ON NAVIGATION UNDER THE SWISS FLAG [NAVIGATION
ACT] art. 30 (Switz.).
284 See FAO FISHERIES, REPORT OF THE EXPERT CONSULTATION ON THE
DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE GLOBAL RECORD OF FISHING VESSELS 52
(FAO Publications ed., 2008).
285 Freedom of the High Seas, [1956] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 278, U.N. Doc.
A/3159 (1956).
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of Maritime Navigation 1988 (“SUA Convention”) and the 2005
Protocol of the SUA Convention are two important binding
treaties that relate to maritime security and peaceful use of the
sea.286 The SUA Convention is primarily concerned with the
safety of maritime navigation.287 The scope of the SUA
Convention is limited to protection of a ship from hijacking or
violence on board or threat to the ship.288 The SUA Convention
286 See SUA Convention and the Protocol, CAPT. S.S. CHAUDHARI ,
https://captsschaudhari.com/2021/09/09/sua-convention-and-the-protocol/ (last
visited Apr. 4, 2022).
287 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation pmbl., Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter
SUA Convention].
This fact is established from the title of the Convention. This position is
confirmed from the relevant portions of the preamble of the Convention. The
relevant portion reads:
“Considering that unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation
jeopardize the safety of persons and property, seriously affect the operation of
maritime services, and undermine the confidence of the peoples of the world in
the safety of maritime navigation [...] Being convinced of the urgent need to
develop international co-operation between States in devising and adopting
effective and practical measures for the prevention of all unlawful acts against
the safety of maritime navigation, and the prosecution and punishment of their
perpetrators [...] Affirming the desirability of monitoring rules and standards
relating to the prevention and control of unlawful acts against ships and
persons on board ships, with a view to updating them as necessary.”
288 SUA Convention, supra note 287, art. 3.
Article 3 of the Convention limits the application of the Convention to
certain instances. It states:
“1. Any person commits an offence if that person unlawfully and
intentionally:
(a) seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any
other form of intimidation; or
(b) performs an act of violence against a person on board a ship if that act
is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or
(c) destroys a ship or causes damage to a ship or to its cargo which is likely
to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or
(d) places or causes to be placed on a ship, by any means whatsoever, a
device or substance which is likely to destroy that ship, or cause damage to
that ship or its cargo which endangers or is likely to endanger the safe
navigation of that ship; or
(e) destroys or seriously damages maritime navigational facilities or
seriously interferes with their operation, if any such act is likely to endanger
the safe navigation of a ship; or
(f) communicates information which he knows to be false, thereby
endangering the safe navigation of a ship; or
(g) injures or kills any person, in connection with the commission or the
attempted commission of any of the offences set forth in subparagraphs (a) to
(f).
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only covers commercial vessels and does not cover naval
vessels.289 The conspicuous drawback of the SUA Convention is
that it is flag state centric.290 Only the flag state can exercise
jurisdiction and the coastal state is excluded from exercising
jurisdiction.291 The SUA Convention also does not discuss
situations where ships are used to perpetrate terrorist
attacks.292 The SUA Convention does not cover situations of
equipping terrorists and using ships as instruments of a
terrorist weapon against a state, undertaken in any part of the
ocean except internal waters or smuggling of potential offenders,
equipment and material in the territory of a state to perpetrate
acts of terrorism.293 José Luis Jesus views that in order to cure
this gap, coastal states should have policing powers and exercise
assertive jurisdiction over their territorial sea.294
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, measures were needed for
protection from a seaward terrorist attack, so the 2005 Protocol
updated the SUA Convention.295 The objective of the 2005
Protocol is
[R]evision of existing international legal and technical measures
and the consideration of new measures in order to prevent and
suppress terrorism against ships and to improve security aboard
and ashore, and thereby to reduce the risk to passengers, crews
and port personnel on board ships and in port areas and to vessels
2. Any person also commits an offence if that person:
(a) attempts to commit any of the offences set forth in paragraph 1; or
(b) abets the commission of any of the offences set forth in paragraph 1
perpetrated by any person or is otherwise an accomplice of a person who
commits such an offence; or
(c) threatens, with or without a condition, as is provided for under national
law, aimed at compelling a physical or juridical person to do or refrain from
doing any act, to commit any of the offences set forth in paragraph 1,
subparagraphs (b), (c) and (e), if that threat is likely to endanger the safe
navigation of the ship in question.”
289 Id. art. 2.
290 Id. art. 8.
291 S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 110–25, at 2 (2005).
292 Jesus, supra note 83, at 393–94.
293 Jesus, supra note 83, at 394.
294 Id. at 394–95.
295 See generally Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Protocol to the Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation,
LEG/CONF.
15/21
(Nov.
1,
2005),
https://www.refworld.org/docid/49f58c8a2.html
(updating
the
SUA
Convention) [hereinafter 2005 SUA Protocol].
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and their cargoes [and] the urgent need for all States to take
additional effective measures to prevent the proliferation of
nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of
delivery.296

The 2005 SUA Protocol has made substantial advancements
over the SUA Convention by covering a wide range of activities,
including the situations (a) to (f) discussed in this article.297
The SUA Convention was already broad in terms of its
territorial application.298 Its subject matter coverage has been
broadened by the 2005 Protocol, yet the sanctioning mechanism
under the 2005 Protocol is limited.299 Despite covering the
situations (a) to (f) in which terrorist attacks could take place
and achieving greater coordination and cooperation of states, the
2005 Protocol has important weaknesses in comparison to the
regime under UNCLOS. The 2005 SUA Protocol confirms the
exclusive right of flag state of boarding and taking action and
provides steps for facilitation of such authorization.300
Therefore, the shortcomings of the original SUA Convention
remain. It directs the transfer of accused persons and provides
evidence for prosecution.301 The 2005 Protocol simply imposes
an obligation on state Parties to “co-operate to the fullest extent
possible,” thereby leaving discretion to states. 302 Before taking
any action, an elaborate procedure has to be followed, such as
prior information about the suspect ship along with its
identification number - there is no time to comply with elaborate
procedures in situations covered under this article.303
Id. pmbl.
See 2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 295, at 2–21 (listing the
advancements made by the 2005 SUA Protocol).
298 See Wolfrum, supra note 252, at 8 (explaining how the Rome
Convention was broad in the scope of defining terrorism).
299 SUA Protocol, supra note 295, at pmbl.
300 Treves, supra note 192, at ¶ 24.
301 2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 234, art. 12.
302 Id. art. 8.
303 Id.
The relevant clauses of Article 8 provide the procedure:
“2. Each request pursuant to this article should, if possible, contain the
name of the suspect ship, the IMO ship identification number, the port of
registry, the ports of origin and destination, and any other relevant
information. If a request is conveyed orally, the requesting Party shall confirm
the request in writing as soon as possible. The requested Party shall
acknowledge its receipt of any written or oral request immediately.
3. States Parties shall take into account the dangers and difficulties
296
297
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Additionally, the profound drawback of the 2005 Protocol is the
absence of the kinds of responses a coastal state could undertake
in addition to prosecution. The remedy of prosecution is futile
in situations where the terrorist vessel is on a suicide mission, a
fact established from experiences in past. 304 The terrorist
vessels are an imminent and immediate threat to the security of
the coastal state.305 Delay in taking actions would result in
catastrophic consequences, and the response time for the

involved in boarding a ship at sea and searching its cargo, and give
consideration to whether other appropriate measures agreed between the
States concerned could be more safely taken in the next port of call or
elsewhere.
4. A State Party that has reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence set
forth in article 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater has been, is being or is about to be
committed involving a ship flying its flag, may request the assistance of other
States Parties in preventing or suppressing that offence. The States Parties so
requested shall use their best endeavours to render such assistance within the
means available to them.
5. Whenever law enforcement or other authorized officials of a State Party
(“the requesting Party”) encounter a ship flying the flag or displaying marks of
registry of another State Party (“the first Party”) located seaward of any State’s
territorial sea, and the requesting Party has reasonable grounds to suspect
that the ship or a person on board the ship has been, is or is about to be involved
in the commission of an offence set forth in article 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater, and
the requesting Party desires to board,
(a) it shall request, in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 that the first
Party confirm the claim of nationality, and
(b) if nationality is confirmed, the requesting Party shall ask the first
Party (hereinafter referred to as “the flag State”) for authorization to board
and to take appropriate measures with regard to that ship which may include
stopping, boarding and searching the ship, its cargo and persons on board, and
questioning the persons on board in order to determine if an offence set forth
in article 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater has been, is being or is about to be committed,
and
(c) the flag State shall either:
(i) authorize the requesting Party to board and to take appropriate
measures set out in subparagraph (b), subject to any conditions it may impose
in accordance with paragraph 7; or
(ii) conduct the boarding and search with its own law enforcement or other
officials; or
(iii) conduct the boarding and search together with the requesting Party,
subject to any conditions it may impose in accordance with paragraph 7; or
(iv) decline to authorize a boarding and search.
The requesting Party shall not board the ship or take measures set out in
subparagraph (b) without the express authorization of the flag State.”
304 Wolfrum, supra note 252, at 10.
305 See id. (assessing the dire issue of terrorism at sea in regards to
international law).
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authorities of the coastal state is very little.306 There are various
responses that would have to be undertaken to respond to
terrorist actions beyond this instrument and are discussed
below.307 These actions are possible by staying within UNCLOS.
While acting under the SUA Convention and the 2005 Protocol,
the rights of the coastal state to use police powers are severely
constrained.308 Furthermore, these rules would be adept and
guiding in relating to large vessels and to tackle situations (a) to
(d).309 As discussed above, for committing terrorist actions in
situations (e) and (f), a small vessel would be used which is
exempted from registration under Article 94 of UNCLOS.310
Even if they are flying a flag, it would not be registered with the
state, whose flag it is flying.311 The 2005 SUA Protocol excludes
the rules of international law on competence of states to exercise
investigation or enforcement jurisdiction on board ships that do
not fly their flag, reversing Article 9 of the SUA Convention.312
Thus, stateless vessels are excluded from the operation of the
2005 SUA Protocol.313 Arguably a terrorist vessel would fall
outside the purview of the 2005 SUA Protocol, but then there is
lack of clarity about under which legal regime actions could be
taken against such a vessel.314 In these situations the powers of
coastal states under UNCLOS would continue to operate.315
The limitation on taking action under the SUA Convention
and the 2005 Protocol due to its flag state bias is evident even in
306 See Christopher C. Joyner, Offshore Maritime Terrorism: International
Implications and the Legal Response, 36 NAVAL WAR COLL. REV. 16, 26–27
(1983) (defining the factors behind an effective response and why those
responses may be constrained).
307 Joyner, supra note 306, at 26–27.
308 Wolfrum, supra note 252, at 8.
309 SUA Convention, supra note 287, art. 3.
310 UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 94.
311 Karim, supra note 78, at 127.
312 Natalie Klein, The Right of Visit and the 2005 Protocol on the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 35
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 287, 318 (2007).
313 Id.
314 See Allyson Bennett, That Sinking Feeling: Stateless Ships, Universal
Jurisdiction, and the Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act, 37 YALE J. INT'L
L. 433, 439 (2012) (detailing that stateless vessels undermine the law-of-the
flag regime and that no state can exercise jurisdiction over them).
315 See, e.g., UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 110(1)(e) (stating that if a vessel
"refus[es] to show its flag, the ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as the
warship" which is reasonable grounds for boarding).
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cases of piracy, another international crime.316 Under the
UNCLOS provisions on piracy, states can take actions directly,
but under the 2005 SAU Protocol there is a need to obtain prior
permission of the flag state before any action could be taken
against a vessel.317 The SUA Convention and the 2005 Protocol
do not provide mechanisms for taking preventive actions.
Instead, it is focused on prosecution of offenders only.318 The
SUA Convention is not an effective tool for taking effective
action against a vessel under the control of terrorists, or even
preventive action.319
The regime under UNCLOS, in
comparison, is flexible and effective in terms of exercising
control over the terrorist vessel and taking effective steps for
that purpose.
Situation (c) is covered by the Protocol for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located
on the Continental Shelf.320 Under such protocol, the coastal
state has jurisdiction to punish the offender.321 The situation is
also covered by the International Ship and Port Facility Security
Code (“ISPS Code”), which is a comprehensive set of measures
designed to enhance the security of ships and port facilities.322
The focus is on the protection of passenger ships and cargo ships
of more than 500 gross tonnage and port facilities serving ships
engaged on international voyages.323 The ISPS Code does not
deal with protection of ships of a smaller size, as it is not
mandatory for small vessels. 324 The focus of these instruments
is on protection of navigation, therefore they do not address

See id. arts. 100–07 (describing piracy as an international crime).
Klein, supra note 312.
318 Id. at 320.
319 Id. at 324.
320 Id. at 323–24.
321 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf art. 3(1), Mar. 10, 1988, 1678
U.N.T.S. 304.
322 Tuerk, supra note 253, at 355; see Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO],
International Ship & Port Facility Security Code and SOLAS Amendments
2002, art. 3.1, IMO Doc. I:\CONF\SOLAS\.5\34. (2002) [hereinafter ISPS
Code].
323 ISPS Code, supra note 250.
324
Non
ISPS
Code
Requirements,
MPA
SING.,
https://www.mpa.gov.sg/web/portal/home/port-of-singapore/security/portsecurity/non-isps-code-requirements (last updated Sept. 11, 2019).
316
317
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threats to a land territory originating in the sea.325 Therefore, a
coastal state can undertake measures on the sea to tackle this
threat, but this threat does not necessarily extend to land.326
Efforts have been made to address the threat in situation
(d) through a multilateral framework.327 As a response to the
threat of use of weapons of mass destruction (“WMD”) at sea,
President George W. Bush declared the Proliferation Security
Initiative (“PSI”).328 PSI is described as “a multinational
response to the challenge posed by the threat of the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).”329
PSI is “a
multilateral
intelligence-sharing
project
incorporating
cooperative actions and coordinated training exercises to
improve the odds of interdicting the transfer of weapons of mass
destruction.”330 It contemplates interception of illicit and
dangerous cargo, and participating states have pledged to
contribute intelligence and physical resources to interdict
vessels at sea that could be a threat to the world community.331
In substance, PSI is a framework for interdiction of vessels on
the high seas based on the suspicion that the vessel is
transporting WMD.332 And its aim is to check vessels carrying
WMD, which need not necessarily be used for terrorist
activity,333 such as when the cargo is lawfully owned by a state
and intended to be used for defense purposes. 334
325 See generally Tuerk, supra note 253, at 366–67 (explaining that the
focus of the SUA Convention and the ISPS Code is navigation, and as the mode
of terrorism changes, a more efficient method for combating it might develop).
326 See UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 2.
327 See S.C. Res. 1540, ¶ 8 (Apr. 28, 2004).
328 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE ,
https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/proliferationsecurity-initiative-psi/ (last updated May 31, 2020).
329
The Proliferation Security Initiative, PSI, https://www.psionline.info/psi-info-en/-/2075520 (last visited Apr. 4, 2022).
330 Jofi Joseph, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Can Interdiction Stop
Proliferation?, 34 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 6 (2004).
331 Michael Becker, The Shifting Public Order of the Oceans: Freedom of
Navigation and the Interdiction of Ships at the Sea, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 131,
134 (2005).
332 Id.
333 See id. at 161–62 (explaining that there need only be "good cause" to
search).
334 Id. at 153, 161–62 (“The United States acknowledged the lack of ‘clear
authority’ for seizing the missiles since the sale between North Korea and
Yemen was not prohibited under any international agreement.”).
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The focus of this article is on situations (e) and (f) which are
covered under the 2005 SUA Protocol. The shortcomings in that
instrument, however, make the provisions under the UNCLOS
more appealing for preventing a terrorist attack.
IV. RESPONSES AGAINST A TERRORIST VESSEL
The extent of measures that a coastal state can undertake
against a terrorist vessel would depend on the extent of
jurisdiction that a coastal state can exercise over that terrorist
vessel.335 State jurisdiction is essentially concerned with the
extent of its right to regulate conduct or the consequences of
events.336 The conduct may be regulated by legislation, courts,
of civil or criminal nature, or by executive or administrative
actions to enforce its laws.337 There is a distinction between the
power to make laws or rules, the prescriptive or legislative
jurisdiction, and the power to take executive action, the
enforcement or prerogative jurisdiction, pursuant to
enforcement of those actions.338 The actions taken against a
terrorist vessel relate to the “enforcement jurisdiction” of the
state and deal primarily with its police powers. Traditionally,
this jurisdiction was territorial, but with the increasing
complexity of international law, jurisdiction can be exercised in
various other ways.339
There are two elements of territorial jurisdiction: subjective
and objective.
According to the subjective jurisdiction,
jurisdiction of a state is created if a crime commences in the
jurisdiction of that state.340 For objective territorial jurisdiction,
principle jurisdiction is founded on the ground that the essential
constituent elements of a crime are consummated on the
territory of a state.341 The objective territorial jurisdiction in
international law also allows jurisdiction over offenses
culminating in the state even if they had not begun there.342 The
Becker, supra note 331, at 196.
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 127, at 456.
337 Id.
338 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 299 (7th ed.
2008).
339 BROWNLIE, supra note 338.
340 Id. at 301.
341 Id.
342
objective
territoriality,
U.N.
TERMINOLOGY
DATABASE,
335
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classic example is firing a gun across borders and killing a
person.343 Therefore, the state in which the person was killed
would have objective territorial jurisdiction.344 Terrorist actions
in situations (e) and (f) fall in the same category. The terrorist
acts start somewhere else but culminate in the coastal state or
an adjoining state. Some offenses are of such grave and
international character that the jurisdiction of states is not tied
by territoriality principle. Piracy is a good example. 345 Some
states have asserted universal jurisdiction in cases of
terrorism346 and according to Antonio Cassesse, terrorism may
not be an offense over which universal jurisdiction is exercisable,
yet it is an international offense over which many states are
willing to assert jurisdiction.347
As per the territoriality principle, a state can exercise
jurisdiction only over its territories but in some situations, there
are exceptions to the rule. If the security of the state is under
threat, then universal jurisdiction can be exercised.348 According
to the passive personality rule, states have exercised
extraterritorial jurisdiction over terrorist acts of foreigners
against their nationals.349 According to Ian Brownlie, “[n]early
all states assume jurisdiction over aliens for acts done abroad
which affect the security of the state, a concept which takes in a
variety of political offences, but is not necessarily confined to
political acts.”350
States frequently punish for currency,
immigration, and economic offenses.351
Extraterritorial
application of jurisdiction has been exercised under domestic
law by states. And jurisdiction exercised over vessels by coastal
https://untermportal.un.org/unterm/Display/record/UNHQ/__objective_territo
riality/58D3C8D4639FDAA385257241006F3F04 (last visited Apr. 5, 2022).
343 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 127, at 459.
344 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 127, at 459–60.
345 Id. at 469.
346 Criminal Jurisdiction Act (Northern Ireland) 1975, c. 59, §§ 1, 2;
Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Act 1976 (Act No. 14/1976) (Ir.),
https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1976/act/14/enacted/en/print.html; Patriot
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272; Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c
C-34, (Can.); Law on the Judiciary art. 23 (B.O.E. 1985, 157) (Spain).
347 Antonio Cassesse, The International Community’s “Legal” Response to
Terrorism, 38 INT’L & COMPAR. L. Q. 589, 593, 602–03, 606 (1989).
348 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 127, at 470–71.
349 Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F.Supp. 1, 15 n.7 (D.D.C. 1998).
350 BROWNLIE, supra note 338, at 304.
351 Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol34/iss2/1

52

Spring 2022 Maritime Security & Threat of a Terrorist Act 53
states is extensive. William Burke has summarized the purview
of enforcement jurisdiction in the following words:
“[e]nforcement is the process of invoking and applying
authoritative prescriptions. The range of operations includes
surveillance, stopping and boarding vessels, search or
inspection, reporting, arrest or seizure of persons and vessels,
detention, and formal application of law by judicial or other
process, including imposition of sanctions.”352
The jurisdiction exercisable in the territorial sea is the
broadest and it consequently reduces as one proceeds further
into the EEZ and then to the high seas. As such, the coastal
state can exercise enforcement jurisdiction on the territorial sea
and the EEZ.353 Whereas on the high seas, the right of the
coastal state extends only to the right of visit and use of force.
A. Interdiction
The right of interdiction exists in the interest of all maritime
nations in the maintenance of order on the high seas.354 There
are no limitations imposed in UNCLOS on the coastal state from
interdicting a vessel while in the territorial waters, the EEZ, or
the continental shelf. The complexity arises only in the case of
high seas. Ordinarily a coastal state can exercise jurisdiction
over a foreign vessel with the consent of the flag state. And there
is no prohibition on states from exercising extraterritorial
jurisdiction on stateless vessels in the high seas. 355 In light of
Security Council Resolution 1373, each state is under a
responsibility to ensure that its ships registered in its
jurisdiction do not indulge into acts of international terrorism.356
If they fail to take action, then it would be acting contrary to
Resolution 1373 and would be violating international law.357 It
would be incompatible with Resolution 1373 to allow the flag
state to object on the basis of sovereign right or lack of explicit

352 WILLIAM BURKE, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES: UNCLOS
1982 AND BEYOND 303 (Clarendon Press ed., 1994).
353 Id. at 312.
354 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 127, at 736.
355 DOUGLAS GUILFOYLE, SHIPPING INTERDICTION AND THE LAW OF THE SEA
296 (Cambridge Univ. Press ed., 2009).
356 Heinegg, supra note 72, at 273.
357 Id.
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consent.358 It is therefore possible to take steps against the
vessel without intimating the flag state because any advance
notice requirement would jeopardize the “effectiveness of the
international efforts against international terrorism.”359
The right of interdiction is covered under the right to visit,
as discussed above. If it is found that a suspected vessel is not a
terrorist vessel, then the coastal state need not proceed further
to take action against the vessel.360 If the suspicion that a vessel
is a terrorist vessel is confirmed, then the natural consequence
is arrest and detention of the ship and punishment to the
persons on the ship under domestic criminal or anti-terrorism
law of the coastal state. 361 If the vessel does not cooperate or
resorts to force, then the authorities from the coastal state would
have to use force to overpower the terrorist vessel.362 If the
vessel is captured then the terrorists on board could be
prosecuted by the coastal state or sent to the state where they
have committed terrorist attack.363 The material aboard the
vessel, including the weapons, ammunition, and other military
equipment, could be captured and seized. 364 It may even result
in the sinking of the terrorist vessel.365
A proper procedure has to be followed prior to interdiction.
Four stages are involved in the process of arresting a terrorist
vessel.366 First, the intention to visit may be communicated by
hailing or through the “informing gun” – i.e., firing either one or
two blank cartridges.367 If the vessel does not take notice then a
shot may be fired across its bows as a signal.368 If there is a

Id. at 261–62.
Id. at 262.
360 Magne Frostad, United Nations Authorized Emargos and Maritime
Interdiction: A Special Focus on Somalia, in THE FUTURE OF THE LAW OF THE
SEA 213, 221 (Gemma Andreone ed., 2017) (ebook).
361 UNODC, MARITIME CRIME: A MANUAL FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE
PRACTITIONERS
127
(June
2019),
https://www.unodc.org/documents/Maritime_crime/1902087_Maritime_Crime_Manual_Second_Edition_ebook.pdf.
362 Heinegg, supra note 72, at 268.
363 UNODC, supra note 361, at 127.
364 Heinegg, supra note 72, at 272.
365 UNODC, supra note 361, at 94.
366 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 127, at 738–39.
367 Id. at 738.
368 Id. at 738.
358
359
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failure to comply then force may be used. 369 In M/V Saiga
(No.2), ITLOS summarized this procedure in the following
words:
The normal practice used to stop a ship at sea is first to give an
auditory or visual signal to stop, using internationally recognized
signals. Where this does not succeed, a variety of actions may be
taken, including the firing of shots across the bows of the ship. It
is only after the appropriate actions fail that the pursuing vessel
may, as a last resort, use force.370

Second, the warships send a boat under the command of an
officer to check the documents of the suspect ship, or the master
of the ship may be ordered to bring the papers for inspection; 371
this is also known as the right of investigation of the flag (droit
d’enquête ou verification du pavillon). If the papers are found to
be in order, then an entry is made in the log book and the vessel
is allowed to proceed for its onward journey.372 Third is the right
of search (droit de visite et inspection).373 Search is naturally
preceded by visit.374 If the visit is not satisfactory, then a search
is conducted.375 The search must be conducted in an orderly
fashion without causing any damage to the cargo.376
If
everything is found in order then an entry is made in the log
book and the vessel is allowed to continue its journey.377 Fourth,
and finally, is arrest (droit de saisir et immobilization).378 Arrest
takes place after visit and search have proved to be
unsatisfactory.379 Arrest is affected through the commander of
the arresting warship who would appoint one of the officers to
take charge of the arrested vessel.380 The arrested vessel is then
to be brought to the harbor.381
369 Convention on the High Seas art. 22, ¶¶ 2–3, Apr. 29. 1958, 450
U.N.T.S. 11.
370 M/V Saiga (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), Case No. 2, Judgment, Jul.
1, 1997, ITLOS Rep. ¶ 156.
371 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 127, at 738.
372 Id.
373 Id. at 738.
374 Id.
375 Id.
376 Id.
377 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 127, at 738–39.
378 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 127.
379 Id. at 738–39.
380 Id.
381 Id.
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The right of interdiction cannot be abused, and the coastal
state must be careful when conducting interdiction. If a
commercial vessel of another state is stopped without sufficient
grounds for suspicion, then the coastal state would have to pay
compensation.382
B. Use of Force
Case law and state practice represents that there are two
aspects of use of force. One under enforcement of police powers,
exercised under treaty provisions or customary international
law, and the other under Article 51 of the UN Charter for selfdefense.383 A coastal state can use force in either form. The use
of force relevant to neutralize a terrorist vessel is covered under
the first category: enforcement of police powers. The use of
“force” for the implementation of provisions under UNCLOS
covers a different domain than Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.384
Steps taken towards implementation of a right of pursuit, police
measures, or coercive measures do not amount to use of force.385
The actions undertaken thereunder are police measures applied
by a state against individuals and not force used by one state
against another.386 Even if the police measures are implemented
through military means, they do not amount to use of force
under the UN Charter.387 The use of force during the exercise of
police powers is a coercive act which does not reflect the
intention of one state to act against another state. 388 In
determining whether an act is a use of force, intention plays a
crucial role. As seen in the Corfu Channel Case, the acts of the
United Kingdom were not treated as a use of force, in violation
of Article 2(4), because there was not that intention.389
According to some commentators, coastal states may invoke
self-defense in response to a terrorist attack.390 However, there
Id. at 738.
CORTEN, supra note 138, at 59.
384 Id. at 56.
385 Id.
386 Id. at 55–56.
387 Id. at 57.
388 CORTEN, supra note 138, at 77.
389 Id.
390 Heinegg, supra note 72, at 261–62, 268; Wolfrum, supra note 252, at
13; Patricia Jimenez Kwast, Maritime Law Enforcement and the Use of Force:
382
383
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is a much stronger case for use of force in enforcing police powers
on the seas. The I.C.J. has given wide interpretation to the use
of force as a part of enforcement jurisdiction of domestic law. In
the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case between Spain and Canada,
Canadians intercepted, boarded, and seized a Spanish shipping
vessel on the high seas. 391 Spain’s contention was that it was a
violation of international law since Spain was the flag state. 392
Canada defended the measure on the grounds that the measure
was aimed at conservation of resources and was undertaken to
enforce domestic law.393 The Court accepted that Canada had
the right to intercept, board, and seize the vessel for enforcement
of its domestic law. The Court held that:
For all of these reasons the Court finds that the use of force
authorized by the Canadian legislation and regulations falls
within the ambit of what is commonly understood as enforcement
of conservation and management measures and thus falls under
the provisions of paragraph 2 (d) of Canada's declaration. This is
so notwithstanding that the reservation does not in terms mention
the use of force. Boarding, inspection, arrest and minimum use of
force for those purposes are all contained within the concept of
enforcement of conservation and management measures according
to a “natural and reasonable” interpretation of this concept.394

The condition of using the sea for peaceful purposes does not
override the right of the coastal state to take enforcement
measures for violations of its laws in the EEZ.395 Coastal states
can exercise police powers in territorial waters and EEZ, and
this force is distinguishable from prohibition on the use of force
under Article 2(4). According to Francesco Francioni:
With respect to the territorial sea, internal waters, and the EEZ,
one must distinguish between use of force in the pursuit of ‘police
powers’ and the ‘transborder’ use of force under article 2(4) of the
Charter. Many of the precedents reviewed indicate that coastal
Reflections on the Categorisation of Forcible Action at Sea in the Light of the
Guyana/Surinam Award, 13 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 49, 68 (2008); Natalino
Ronzitti, The Right of Self-Defense and the Law of Naval Warfare, 14 SYRACUSE
J. INT'L L. & COM. 571 (1987-1988).
391 Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.), Judgment, 1998 I.C.J. 432, ¶ 1
(Dec. 4) [hereinafter Fisheries Jurisdiction].
392 Id. at ¶ 70.
393 Id. at ¶ 15.
394 Fisheries Jurisdiction, supra note 391, ¶ 84.
395 B. Martin Tsamenyl, The Exercise of Coastal State Jurisdiction Over
EEZ Fisheries Resources: The South Pacific Practice, 17 AMBIO 255, 256 (1988).
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States’ action in repelling or arresting foreign intruders represents
an exercise of police power which does not constitute prima facie
violation of article 2(4) of the Charter. At the same time, the
legality of such must be judged in light of the general principles of
necessity and proportionality.396

In the Torrey Canyon Case, UK authorities bombed the
wreck of a Liberian vessel to contain the spread of oil spillage on
the high seas off the coast of UK. 397 Despite the scale of the
military means used, no state treated it as a use of force under
international law and the debate took place within the context
of lawful use of police powers.398
On the high seas, interdiction and boarding of a vessel is
not possible without the consent of the flag state. There must be
some permissive act to interdict or board a vessel.399 Use of
police powers under Article 110 is possible because it represents
prior consent of the flag state for use of force in the nature of
police powers.400 The use of force in the nature of police powers
is permitted through the treaty, and thus is not contrary to
general prohibition.401 Similarly, protecting against a terrorist
action through the use of force is justified on the ground of
protection of human rights. This, however, is not covered under
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter either.402 While interdicting a
vessel, force may be required on a ship which does not cooperate
on the high seas. Therefore, it is permissible to “use necessary
and reasonable force for the purpose of effecting the objects of
boarding, searching, seizing and bringing into port the suspected
396 Francesco Francioni, Peacetime use of Force, Military Activities, and the
New Law of the Sea, 18 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 203, 226 (1985).
397 CORTEN, supra note 138, at 58–59.
398 Id. at 59.
399 Douglas Guilfoyle, Interdicting Vessels to Enforce the Common Interest:
Maritime Countermeasures and the Use of Force, 56 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 69,
80–81 (2007).
400 Guilfoyle, supra note 399, at 81.
401 Id.
402 See CORTEN, supra note 138, at 132–35; U.N. Secretary-General, Report
of the Secretary-General Prepared Pursuant to Resolutions 1160 (1998) and
1999 (1998) of the Security Council, ¶ 29, U.N. Doc. S/1998/912 (October 3,
1998) (commenting on the civil war, referring to the actions of the Yugoslav
army to repress Kosovo Liberation Army, Secretary General observed that:
“[t]he authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have the inherent
right, as well as the duty, to maintain public order and security and to respond
to violent acts of provocation. However, this can in no way justify the
systematic terror inflicted on civilians.”).
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vessel; and if sinking should occur incidentally, as a result of the
exercise of reasonable and necessary force for such purpose, the
pursuing vessel might be entirely blameless.”403
In all respects, if an action is taken under self-defense
against a terrorist attack it must meet the test of
proportionality.404 Likewise, even if the use of force is a part of
enforcement of domestic law, it still must meet the test of
proportionality. This test, along with the other limitations,
suggest that even though there are exceptions to the general
prohibition of the use of force, like most things, the power of the
state is not unlimited.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Some states have claimed new maritime zones to claim
greater protection over the ocean space and uses from the
security perspective, which has met with criticism from other
states.405 The so-called security maritime zones may be intended
for conducting broader surveillance and inspection of vessels
which is bound to meet with resistance from other states seeking
to protect their freedom of navigation on the high seas. They are
prone to abuse because the rights claimed over these zones are
unclear.406 There are chances that these zones could be used to
stifle and defeat the freedom of navigation. For taking action
against a terrorist vessel, declaration of such a zone would not
be necessary. As long as it is a terrorist vessel, the rights of the
coastal state would be wide enough to tackle the threat. In
practice, there is no possibility of an entire container, or a large
ship being used for a terrorist act because it will be detectable.
Considering the magnitude of the threat of the vessel and the
consequential threat, the coastal state could invoke its right of
self-defense in such a situation and take military action in any
case. The question of extent of power exercisable by the coastal
state arises in case of a small vessel that is being used for a
covert terrorist acts.
While security of states and protection from a potential
403

1935).

S.S. “I’m Alone” (Can. v. U.S.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1609, 1617 (Perm. Ct. Arb.

Wolfrum, supra note 252, at 13.
KLEIN, supra note 7, at 7.
406 Id. at 58–60.
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terrorist attack is important, it is necessary to ensure that the
freedom at high seas is not excessively hindered. But the
freedom of navigation itself is already regulated and restricted.
In the commentary to the draft articles for the 1958 High Seas
Convention, it was stated that:
Any freedom that is to be exercised in the interests of all entitled
to enjoy it, must be regulated. Hence, the law of the high seas
contains certain rules, most of them already recognized in positive
international law, which are designed, not to limit or restrict the
freedom of the high seas, but to safeguard its exercises in the
interest of the entire international community.407

The sovereign jurisdiction of the coastal state would extend
to the territorial sea. The coastal state would have power to
interdict and inspect vessels suspected of terrorist activity.
Some sovereign powers, although not all, continue to extend on
areas beyond the territorial sea. States enjoy various rights over
these areas and UNCLOS protects various freedoms at the high
seas. The list is not exhaustive and the states may undertake
additional regulations. The regulations are to be aimed at
safeguarding the freedoms of the states in the interest of the
whole international community.408 Therefore, regulations for
checking terrorist activities – within the framework of UNCLOS
- would be valid.
The freedom of high seas is limited to a reasonable use of
the high seas. Explaining this, D.P. O’Connell wrote:
One common thread running through the formulation of the
various jurisdictional zones in the contemporary law of the sea is
the idea of accommodation of interests, or as a balancing of rights
and duties, which can be summed up in the concept of “reasonable
use.” The result is that there is little absolutism in the rights of
States with respect to the sea.409

The exercise of these powers is with the state with
competent jurisdiction. It would be either by the port state if the
vessel is in the territorial waters or the flag state if the vessel is
407 Documents of the Eight Session, Including the Report of the Commission
to the General Assembly, [1956] 2 Y.B Int’l L. Comm’n 278, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.1.
408 U.N. CLOS, 8th Sess., 9th mtg. at 15 ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/40
(Mar. 13, 1958).
409 O’CONNELL, supra note 277, at 57.
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in the high seas.410 However, since a terrorist vessel is a
stateless vessel, any state can exercise prescriptive jurisdiction
over a terrorist vessel. José Luis José Luis Jesus has observed
that:
The possible acceptance of jurisdiction of any state party to police
ships suspected of being involved with terrorist acts on the high
seas areas of the ocean would be another encroachment on the
state’s sovereignty or exclusive jurisdiction over ships flying their
flags. However, it would be a legitimate encroachment to the
extent that it would be done for a good purpose, benefitting all
states.411

There is another reason for having a robust security
mechanism on the sea. The battle against terrorism has a strong
element of psychological warfare. The impact is on the psyche
of the citizens. Areas prone to terrorist attack tend to suffer in
more than one way, whether or not they are actually attacked.
Investors are unwilling to invest in areas that are prone to
terrorist attack from the sea. The threat of an attack would
affect businesses associated with seafaring but also other
activities on the land which may not be directly related to the
business activities relating to the use of the sea. An effective
and alert mechanism for security would ensure that states
remain safe. It is therefore necessary that there are steps taken
by the coastal state to ensure protection from a seaward terrorist
attack.
While exercising control over suspected terrorist vessels,
the coastal state shall apply its domestic regulations and take
actions without discrimination. Any action shall be preceded by
reasonable suspicion otherwise the state would be responsible to
pay compensation to the flag state for damage caused to the
vessel. All restrictions on innocent passage are subject to a nondiscrimination standard.412 The discussion here would not
adversely impact freedom of navigation and maritime trade
because the terrorist vessel in question is a small vessel. Other
treaties and multilateral frameworks for cooperation do not
cover these small vessels.
See Karim, supra note 78, at 127 (discussing flag state's authority over
its vessels); see also Fitzmaurice, supra note 132, at 112 (discussing a state's
authority in its territorial waters).
411 Jesus, supra note 83, at 395.
412 UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 24(1)(b).
410
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Despite differences in the extent of control a coastal state
can exercise over different maritime zones under UNCLOS, the
coastal state has wide powers to interject and neutralize a
terrorist vessel.
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